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INTRODUCTION
Although reports of the death of the peremptory challenge
have been greatly exaggerated,' the debate about its continuing
vitality rages on, both in the academy and in the courts.2 After
t District Court Judge, Second Judicial District (Denver), State of Colorado. I want to
thank three students from the University of Denver Law School-Michael Greenfeig,
Gregg Klingenberg, and Christopher McGee--whose help in accessing the shiny wonders
of computer research, as well as the dusty wonders of old-fashioned library research, was
invaluable to my preparation of this article. The views expressed here are of course my
own, and do not reflect the views of the Denver District Court or any of my colleagues on
that Court.
1 See, for example, Karen M. Bray, Comment, Reaching the Final Chapter in the
Story of Peremptory Challenges, 40 UCLA L Rev 517, 554-564 (1992); James J. Gobert,
The Peremptory Challenge-An Obituary, 1989 Crim L Rev 528, 530-33; Jason Hochberg,
Peremptory Challenge: An American Relic Like the Model-T Ford and the $2 Bill, Its Time
Has Passed, 10 WTR Crim Just 10 (1996); Brian E. Leach, Comment, Extending Batson v.
Kentucky to Gender and Beyond: The Death Knell for the Peremptory Challenge?, 19 SILT
L J 381, 401-02 (1995); Michael A. Cressler, Comment, Powers v. Ohio: The Death Knell
for the Peremptory Challenge?, 28 Idaho L Rev 349, 353 (1991-92); Keith A. Ward, Com-
ment, "The Only Thing in the Middle of the Road is a Dead Skunk and a Yellow Stripe":
Peremptory Challenges-Take 'Em or Leave 'Em, 26 Tex Tech L Rev 1361, 1387-92 (1995);
Barbara L. Horwitz, Comment, The Extinction of the Peremptory Challenge: What Will
the Jury System Lose By Its Demise?, 61 U Cin L Rev 1391, 1427-39 (1993); Brian Wilson,
Case Note, Batson v. Kentucky: Can the "New" Peremptory Challenge Survive the Resur-
rection of Strauder v. West Virginia?, 20 Akron L Rev 355, 363-64 (1986); Eric N. Ein-
horn, Note, Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex. rel. T.B.: Is the Peremptory
Challenge Still Preeminent?, 36 BC L Rev 161, 197-200 (1994); Angela J. Mason, Note,
Discrimination Based on Religious Affiliation: Another Nail in the Peremptory Challenge's
Coffin?, 29 Ga L Rev 493, 536-38 (1995); Patricia F. Kaufman, Note, The Beginning of the
End of Peremptory Challenges: Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992), 16 Harv J L
& Pub Policy 287, 293 (1993); Edmund L. Quatmann, Jr., Note, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex. rel.
T.B.: The Extension of the Equal Protection Clause to Gender-Based Peremptory Chal-
lenges-Is This the End?, 39 SLU L J 1349, 1385-86 (1995); Gary C. Furst, Note, Will the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act Be Strike Three Against Peremptory Challenges?, 30
Valp U L Rev 701, 716 (1996). See also that portion of Professor Alschuler's article won-
derfully titled The Unconstitutionality of the Peremptory Challenge: Is It Bedtime for Bat-
son?, in Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U Chi L Rev 153, 199-211 (1989). To be
fair to Professor Alschuler, he doesn't so much predict bedtime for Batson as plead for it.
2 In the academy, see, for example, Alschuler, 56 U Chi L Rev at 199-211 (cited in
note 1); Cheryl G. Bader, Batson Meets the First Amendment: Prohibiting Peremptory
Challenges That Violate a Prospective Juror's Speech and Association Rights, 24 Hofstra
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experiencing peremptory challenges firsthand for six years as a
trial judge in a state court of general jurisdiction, I now add my
small voice to the chorus calling for abolition.
I am a late convert. It has taken a shift of reference frame
from bar to bench, and then from civil bench to criminal bench,
for me to reach the point where I now believe that the benefits of
the peremptory challenge system are outweighed by the damage
which that system causes to the most basic principles of an im-
partial jury.
I am a reluctant convert. My reluctance springs from a deep
respect for the traditions surrounding the right to a jury trial,
and a personal conviction, confirmed by my experience on the
L Rev 567, 583-86 (1996); Roberta K. Flowers, Does It Cost Too Much? A "Difference" Look
at J.E.B. v. Alabama, 64 Fordham L Rev 491, 530-33 (1995); Katherine Goldwasser, Lim-
iting a Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in
a Criminal Trial, 102 Harv L Rev 808, 839 (1989); Brent J. Gurney, Note, The Case for
Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 Harv CR-CL L Rev 227, 244-56
(1986); Robert L. Harris, Jr., Note, Redefining the Harm of Peremptory Challenges, 32
Wm & Mary L Rev 1027, 1052-64 (1991); Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory
Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 Tex L Rev 1041, 1114-36 (1995); Kenneth J.
Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory Chal-
lenges, 71 Notre Dame L Rev 447, 502-03 (1996); Jere W. Morehead, When a Peremptory
Challenge is No Longer Peremptory: Batson's Unfortunate Failure to Eradicate Invidious
Discrimination From Jury Selection, 43 DePaul L Rev 625, 636-41 (1994); Robert M.
O'Connell, Note, The Elimination of Racism from Jury Selection: Challenging the Per-
emptory Challenge, 32 BC L Rev 433, 483-85 (1991); William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky:
Curing the Disease but Killing the Patient, 1987 S Ct Rev 97, 123-56; Barbara D. Under-
wood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway?, 92
Colum L Rev 725, 760-74 (1992).
In the courts, the Supreme Court continues its struggle to find a sensible and consti-
tutionally principled way to prevent Batson from swallowing peremptory challenges en-
tirely. See text accompanying notes 132-61. Judges at all levels, in reported opinions,
commentary, and surveys, have begun to articulate discontent not only with Batson but
with the larger question of peremptory challenges themselves. See, for example, Alen v
State, 596 S2d 1083, 1086-95 (Fla Dist Ct App 1992) (Hubbart concurring) (arguing in fa-
vor of abolition); Davis v State, 333 Md 27, 633 A2d 867, 876 (1993) (referring to academic
and judicial debates on elimination of peremptory challenges); Gilchrist v State, 97 Md
App 55, 627 A2d 44, 55-56 (Md Ct Spec App 1993) (Wilner concurring) (recommending re-
consideration of peremptory challenges altogether); State v Wacaser, 794 SW2d 190, 196-
99 (Mo 1990) (Robertson concurring) (expressing support for abolition of peremptory
challenges). Perhaps the most remarkable of these judicial criticisms is Judge Bellacosa's
concurrence in Bolling, in which he, joined by tvo of his colleagues on the New York
Court of Appeals, pleads with the New York legislature to abolish peremptory challenges
entirely. People v Bolling, 79 NY2d 317, 582 NYS2d 950, 960 (1992) (Bellacosa concur-
ring). No doubt the most comprehensive criticism is Judge Broderick's article in the Tem-
ple Law Review. Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abol-
ished, 65 Temple L Rev 369, 416-23 (1992).
A 1995 survey of federal trial judges disclosed that a hefty 15 percent of all respon-
dents favored the abolition of peremptory challenges. Christopher E. Smith and Roxanne
Ochoa, The Peremptory Challenge in the Eyes of the Trial Judges, 79 Judicature 185, 188,
Table 3 (Jan-Feb 1996). An additional 19 percent favored some modification of current
rules or practices regarding the peremptory challenge. Id.
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bench, that jury trials really do work.' For me, something must
be seriously wrong if a practice as widespread and time-honored
as the peremptory challenge is to be discarded. Something is se-
riously wrong.
Criticisms and defenses of Batson v Kentucky4 are legion, and
I do not intend to cover that well worn ground.5 Nor do I intend
to enter directly into the empirical debate (what effect peremp-
tory challenges actually have on case outcomes),6 the technical
debate (what effect abolition would have on other phases of jury
' In this sense, I have come to my skepticism about the peremptory challenge from a
very different direction than those commentators who question the utility of the jury trial
itself, especially the civil jury trial, and who see the peremptory challenge as just another
inexplicable bell and whistle on an already irrational contraption. These criticisms have
accelerated of late as part of the general handwringing about tort reform. See, for exam-
ple, Stephen Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil Justice
Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric and Agenda-Building, 52 L & Contemp Probs 269, 279-308
(Autumn 1989) (describing the public attack on civil juries). In fact, our ambivalence
about the jury trial has a long and storied past. Hans Zeisel, The Debate Over the Civil
Jury in Historical Perspective, 1990 U Chi Legal F 25, 27-29 (1990) (describing a debate
on jury size). See also Julia E. Johnsen, ed, Jury System (H.W. Wilson 1929). I do not pre-
tend that the jury trial is always an efficient or even rational mechanism, but my experi-
ence suggests that it is generally a just one, both in civil and criminal cases. In any event,
the jury trial is a constitutional given; the peremptory challenge is not.
I do not entirely share Professor Marder's powerfully developed view that the consti-
tutional test for peremptory challenges should shift from the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Sixth Amendment. Nor do I agree with her broad perception of the jury as a public
institution struggling with complex issues of policy. See Marder, 73 Tex L Rev at 1095,
1125-36 (cited in note 2). Although I agree that peremptory challenges must one day face
the music of the Sixth Amendment, and perhaps even fail because they nullify the fair
cross-section requirement, see text accompanying notes 230-35, I have a trial judge's
rather myopic view of the trial process. Trials decide single cases between specific liti-
gants. We need impartial juries, not to vindicate the participatory interests of prospective
jurors, but rather to decide individual cases justly.
4 476 US 79 (1986).
Most of the commentaries listed in notes 1 and 2 are, fundamentally, examinations
of Batson and its progeny. They boil down to some combination of these basic perspec-
tives: (1) Batson is an uncontrollable beast that eventually, but lamentably, will destroy
the peremptory challenge; (2) the peremptory challenge is the beast, and Batson will
eventually slay the beast; and (3) Batson is a sensible limitation on peremptory chal-
lenges, though from time to time it may need some difficult fine-tuning. My own views
have evolved from perspective number 3 into perspective number 2.
See, for example, Frederick L. Brown, Frank T. McGuire, and Mary S. Winters, The
Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or
Abuse, 14 New Eng L Rev 192 (1978); Gobert, 1989 Crim L Rev at 531 (cited in note 1)
(finding that the use of peremptory challenges does not increase a defendant's chances of
acquittal or lower the chances of conviction); Julie Vennard and David Riley, The Use of
Peremptory Challenge and Stand by of Jurors and their Relationship to Trial Outcome,
1988 Crim L Rev 731; Hans Zeisel and Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory
Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 Stan L
Rev 491, 507 (1978) (finding the effects of peremptory strikes to be minimal on jury ver-
dicts in a majority of cases). Some of the most recent empirical studies on the efficacy, or
lack of efficacy, of the peremptory challenge are collected at Marder, 73 Tex L Rev at
1080-83 nn 156-64 (cited in note 2).
1997]
The University of Chicago Law Review
selection, including, in particular, challenges for cause),7 or the
constitutional debate (whether Batson and its progeny compel
the conclusion that peremptory challenges are unconstitutional).'
Instead, I want to try to articulate how, as a provincial trustee of
this institution of the jury trial, I have come to realize that the
very notion of peremptory challenges is in hopeless conflict with
our ideals of what an impartial jury is and how it should be se-
lected.
In assessing this problem, I want to begin by considering the
history of the peremptory challenge and in particular by exam-
ining the idea that the peremptory challenge is fundamentally
flawed, both because it is rooted in the now meaningless and
quite undemocratic concept of royal infallibility, and because it
was invented two hundred years before the notion of jury impar-
tiality. Apart from these defects in origin, I also want to examine
the proposition that the conditions which gave rise to, and may
have supported the continuation of, the peremptory challenge
simply do not exist today. Finally, with these historical perspec-
tives in mind, I want to consider the various ways in which the
peremptory challenge is inimical to our most fundamental pre-
cepts of an impartial jury.
I. THE HISTORY OF TE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
There has been a kind of mythic genealogy constructed about
the peremptory challenge. To be sure, the idea of the peremptory
challenge is old, but it is not nearly as old, deep, or widespread
as the notion of the jury itself. Its ancient association with the
right to trial by jury has cloaked it with a presumption of legiti-
macy bordering on, but never quite reaching, the constitutional.
Although there is no shortage of academic and judicial generali-
zations about the importance of the peremptory challenge,9 there
' See, for example, Bray, Comment, 40 UCLA L Rev at 556-58 (cited in note 1);
Marder, 73 Tex L Rev at 1080-83 (cited in note 2).
' See, for example, Bolling, 582 NYS2d at 958-60 (Bellacosa concurring) (arguing
that the peremptory challenge can be used as a tool of invidious discrimination);
Alschuler, 56 U Chi L Rev at 199-214 (cited in note 1) (suggesting that the exercise of
peremptory challenges is at odds with the Equal Protection Clause); Broderick, 65 Tem-
ple L Rev at 399-410 (cited in note 2) (suggesting that peremptory challenges are at odds
with values behind the Equal Protection Clause, and the Sixth and Thirteenth Amend-
ments). See also notes 142 and 143 and accompanying text.
No doubt the most often-quoted generalization is Blackstone's description of the
peremptory challenge as "a provision full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners,
for which our English laws are justly famous." William M. Blackstone, 4 Commentaries
on the Laws of England *353 (W.L. Dean 1846). Less often-quoted is the immediately pre-
ceding sentence, which describes the peremptory challenge as "an arbitrary and capri-
cious species of challenge." Id. Perhaps no two sentences so elegantly capture the am-
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have been remarkably few efforts to articulate precisely why the
peremptory challenge is so important. Indeed, when pressed to
do more than simply pontificate on the generalized importance of
the peremptory challenge, the Supreme Court has consistently
and unflinchingly held that the peremptory challenge is neither a
constitutionally necessary component of a defendant's right to an
impartial jury," nor even so fundamental as to be part of federal
common law." Moreover, when a trial court erroneously inter-
feres with a party's peremptory challenges, that interference is
often deemed harmless. 2 Perhaps there has never been a legal
"right" so praised in the abstract, yet so rejected when the consti-
tutional, common law, and harmless error rubber actually meets
the road.
One of the keys to understanding this ambivalence, and to
recognizing that the peremptory challenge is not only not re-
quired for an impartial jury but may in fact be in conflict with it,
lies in its rather unusual history.
A. Pre-English History
The notion of a jury-a group of people brought together to
resolve disputes between other people-is as old as civilization
itself. Indeed, mythology is laced with examples of juries, both
mortal and immortal, deciding disputes between gods, disputes
between mortals, and even disputes between gods and mortals.13
bivalence and downright schizophrenia with which peremptory challenges have been
viewed throughout their history.
See text accompanying notes 81-82.
The prosecutor's entitlement to peremptory challenges is not grounded in federal
common law, though a defendant's probably is. See text accompanying notes 83-85.
See text accompanying notes 162-72.
'3 There are several Norse and Greek myths involving trial by jury. The whole of the
Norse mythic universe was ruled by a jury of sorts-twelve gods, each of whom held a
"judgment seat," who took counsel together. Peter Andreas Munch, Norse Mythology:
Legends of Gods and Heroes 5-6 (New York 3d ed 1954). Odin, the supreme Norse god and
foreman, so to speak, of this ruling jury, ordained twelve demigods to preside over more
mundane earthly disputes. Lloyd E. Moore, The Jury: Tool of Kings, Palladium of Liberty
4 (Anderson 2d ed 1988). The Greek god Ares was tried for the murder of Poseidon's son
by a jury of twelve gods. They hung six to six. Id at 1; Alexander S. Murray, The Manual
of Mythology 237 (New Hollywood 1993). The first Greek mortal tried by a mythical jury
appears to have been Orestes, the son of Agamemnon and the brother of Electra. He was
tried for the murder of his mother, whom he caused to be killed in a conspiracy with Elec-
tra and at the irresistible urgings of Apollo. Athena convened a jury of twelve mortals to
hear the case against Orestes (who was defended, ably we must assume, though with no
small conflict of interest, by Apollo himself). Again, the jury hung six to six. Moore, The
Jury at 1. The Orestes trial, as part of the broader Agamemnon myth, was retold by
Aeschylus in his play The Oresteia and by Euripedes in his play Orestes. See Aeschylus,
Oresteia (Cambridge 1979) (Frederic Raphael and Keneth Macleish, trans); and
Euripedes, Orestes (Bryn Mawr 1984) (Thomas M. Falkner, trans).
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Though never the preeminent method of ancient dispute resolu-
tion, juries in some form or another were known in Ancient
Egypt, Mycenae, Druid England, Greece, Rome, Viking Scandi-
navia, the Holy Roman Empire, and even Saracen Jerusalem be-
fore the Crusades. 4 Many of these forms of juries appear to have
arisen quite independently from one another, 5 confirming that
the idea of the jury resides deep in the human psyche.
By contrast, the notion of a peremptory challenge-the right
of a disputant to veto an otherwise qualified juror-has a sub-
stantially less comprehensive history. There are no myths about
peremptory challenges, and nothing like peremptory challenges
appears in any ancient jury system until the Roman system de-
scribed below.'6 Athenian juries, for example, were composed of
qualified citizens randomly selected by lot to serve on a particu-
lar case. 7  Typically, these early Athenian juries-called
"dikasteria"-were very large, ranging in size from two hundred
to fifteen hundred members, and those who were picked served, 8
with no recorded mechanism for the litigants to intervene in
their selection.
The Athenian dikasteria were later copied by the Romans,
who called their jurors "Judices" and used them for their senato-
rial trials. 9 Roman Judices were the first ancient jurors to be
selected by anything even remotely resembling the modern per-
emptory challenge. For all but fifty years during a particularly
egalitarian time in the first century, the Judices were chosen ex-
clusively from the senatorial class.2 ° Once each year the Senate
would designate which of its members would serve as prospective
jurors in all senatorial trials for that year. From this group,
eighty-one senators would be selected by lot for any particular
14 Moore, The Jury at 1-20 (cited in note 13); John Proffatt, A Treatise on Trial By
Jury, Including Questions of Law and Fact §§ 1-10 (Rothman 1986); Theodore F.T.
Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 107-31 (Little, Brown 5th ed 1956).
15 Moore, The Jury at 4-8 (cited in note 13). See also notes 27 and 28 and accompany-
ing text.
16 See text accompanying notes 19-21.
Douglas M. MacDowell, The Law In Classical Athens 33-40 (Cornell 1978); Moore,
The Jury at 2 (cited in note 13) (citizens had to be over thirty years old with no debt to
the state).
" Moore, The Jury at 2 (cited in note 13); Proffatt, Trial by Jury § 6 (cited in note 14).
19 Moore, The Jury at 3 (cited in note 13). Senatorial trials were just one type of Ro-
man trial, and they were generally limited to political cases, disputes between senators,
particularly scandalous crimes, and other matters of special imperial significance. The
bulk of day-to-day Roman trials were non-jury trials decided by individual prefects or
other imperial officials. See generally Peter Garnsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege in
the Roman Empire 19-25 (Oxford 1970).
2' From 122 B.C. to 70 B.C., the Judices were drawn not only from the senatorial
class but also from the equestrian class. Moore, The Jury at 3 (cited in note 13).
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trial. Each litigant in that trial could challenge fifteen prospec-
tive jurors, leaving a jury of fifty-one.21
With the notable exceptions of the dikasteria and Judices, it
appears that the function of most ancient juries was a limited
one: to investigate and then report suspected criminal activity,
with the ultimate guilt or innocence of the accused to be deter-
mined later, by non-jury methods." These early juries thus
served both an investigatory and accusatory function,23 and of
course that role continues today in our institution of the grand
jury. Even as jurors began over time to play an increasing role in
the actual trial, their role remained a somewhat complex mixture
of accuser and actual witness. Jurors were the ruler's watchdogs
for criminal behavior, and they were selected by the ruler's
agents precisely because they may have had personal knowledge
of the alleged crime, or, more often, personal knowledge of the
accused or of the victim. This notion of jurors as witnesses, as
opposed to jurors as independent judges of the credibility of trial
witnesses," was so deeply ingrained in the ancient jury that it
remained part of the English jury system until late in the four-
teenth century.25 The concept of the ancient juror's limited role as
witness may explain the absence of any ancient practices akin to
peremptory challenges, with the exception, of course, of the selec-
tion of the Roman Judices.
B. The Peremptory Challenge in England
Even though the selection method of the Judices bears some
resemblance to the modern peremptory challenge, there is little
evidence that the concept of the Judices spread from Rome to
England.26 On the contrary, although there was once a great de-
bate on the question, 7 it is now generally accepted that the Eng-
21 Id. This number of eighty-one for the initial panel varied somewhat over time,
ranging from fifty-one to eighty-one. Id.
William Forsyth, History of Trial by Jury 106 (Burt Franklin 2d ed 1971); Robert
von Moschzisker, Trial by Jury §§ 66-67 at 53-57 (Bisel 2d ed 1930); Sir Frederick Pollock
and Frederic William Maitland, 2 The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward
1622-23 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1899); Proffatt, Trial by Jury §§ 27-29 (cited in note 14).
Moore, The Jury at 14 (cited in note 13).
Moore, The Jury at 40 (cited in note 13).
Forsyth, History of Trial at 125-38 (cited in note 22); Moore, The Jury at 56 (cited in
note 13); Proffatt, Trial by Jury §§ 29-30 (cited in note 14); von Moschzisker, Trial by
Jury § 68 at 57-58 (cited in note 22). Indeed, very early English jurors may simply have
decided which of the various ordeals a defendant should face. Plucknett, A Concise His-
tory of the Common Law at 120 (cited in note 14).
oore, The Jury at 3-4 (cited in note 13) (suggesting slight possibility of a residual
Greek and Roman influence).
' The debate appears to have begun in the seventeenth century, when the jury be-
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lish probably did not inherit the jury trial from the Romans, and
that the jury was unknown to the English until the Conquest."
Most likely, trial by jury was introduced into England by William
the Conqueror, who added it to the three basic trial methods al-
ready practiced in England and on the Continent since Charle-
magne: trial by compurgation, trial by battle, and trial by or-
deal. 9 Trial by compurgation (in which the winning litigant was
the one who could bring a designated number of respected people
to court willing to swear to the truth of his oath)" was generally
limited in post-Conquest England to minor civil disputes and
misdemeanor criminal offenses." Trial by battle, favored by the
came an idealized anti-royalist institution. Some historians, amateur and professional
alike, had political motives to trace the English jury to democratic roots in Greece and
Rome or, at the very least, to quasi-democratic roots in Anglo-Saxon villages before the
Conquest, rather than to royal ancestors on the Continent. See, for example, Moore, The
Jury at 3-4, 18-19 (cited in note 13) (noting possibility that jury may have had Roman or
Frankish influence). See also von Moschzisker, Trial by Jury §§ 6-10 at 6-11 (cited in note
22); Pollock and Maitland, 2 History of English Law at 604 n 1 (cited in note 22).
The English jury most likely traces its immediate origins to Charlemagne's
"inquisito" (a type of Frankish jury); thus, neither the idea nor the practice of jury trials
probably existed in England before the Conquest. See generally Heinrich Brunner, The
Origin of Juries (Berlin 1872) (finding that the English jury had Frankish origins), re-
ported in Moore, The Jury at 13-19 (cited in note 13); John P. Dawson, A History of Lay
Judges 118-21 (Harvard 1960); von Moschzisker, Trial by Jury §§ 6-10 at 6-11 (cited in
note 22). Pollack and Maitland recognized the non-democratic origins of the English jury:
[B]ut for the conquest of England, [the jury] would have perished . . . . [The]
'palladium of our liberties' is in its origin not English but Frankish, not popular but
royal.
Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, 1 The History of English Law Before
the Time of Edward 1 141-42 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1899).
Moore, The Jury at 26-30, 41, 123 (cited in note 13); Proffatt, Trial by Jury §§ 11-20
(cited in note 14).
' Trial by compurgation is also sometimes called the "wager of law." In criminal tri-
als by compurgation, the defendant first took an oath of his innocence, and then he called
a designated number of compurgators, or "oath helpers." The number required varied
from twelve to forty-eight depending on the seriousness of the charges and on the rank of
the defendant and his compurgators. The compurgators did not testify in the modem
sense; they merely vouched for the trustworthiness of the defendant's oath of innocence.
If the required number and quality of compurgators appeared and vouched for the defen-
dant, he was declared innocent. See generally von Moschzisker, Trial by Jury §§ 43-45 at
34-37 (cited in note 22); Moore, The Jury at 27 (cited in note 13).
In civil trials by compurgation, the plaintiff took his oath and called his compurga-
tors. If their numbers, quality, and oaths were sufficient, the burden then passed to the
defendant to take his oath and call his compurgators. He was cautioned about the conse-
quences of a false oath, but generally if the defendant swore he was not liable and his
oath was supported by a sufficient number and quality of compurgators, judgment was
entered for the defendant because the plaintiff usually had the burden of proof. von
Moschzisker, Trial by Jury §§ 43-44 at 34-36 (cited in note 22); Blackstone, 3 Commentar-
ies at *343 (cited in note 9).
" Moore, The Jury at 26-27 (cited in note 13). Even before it fell into disuse, trial by
compurgation was not usually available in certain cases-such as those involving official
misconduct, suits on debts secured by real property, some types of perjury, and crimes
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Normans, also eventually fell into disuse. 2 For serious criminal
cases or other cases involving important issues, trial by ordeal
remained the dispute resolution mechanism of choice (at least
the Crown's and the Church's choice, if not the defendant's).3
Trial by jury during this period remained exceedingly rare. 4
"openly committed"-in which the temptation to bribe compurgators was deemed too
great. von Moschzisker, Trial by Jury §§ 46-48 at 37-38 (cited in note 22).
Not only in England, but also throughout medieval northern Europe, Viking tradi-
tions of trial by battle, also sometimes called trial by combat, found their way into ac-
cepted trial procedures, at least to resolve certain disputes between members of the rul-
ing classes. Blackstone, 3 Commentaries at *337-41 (cited in note 9) (civil); Blackstone, 4
Commentaries at *346-48 (cited in note 9) (criminal); Forsyth, History of Trial at 81 (cited
in note 22); von Moschzisker, Trial by Jury § 17 at 14 (cited in note 22); Plucknett, His-
tory of the Common Law at 116 (cited in note 14). As disputing nobles began to be permit-
ted to hire champions in their stead-and perhaps more importantly, as the influence of
the Church began to dissolve the sharper pagan edges of Norse traditions-trial by battle
became displaced almost entirely by the ordeal, von Moschzisker, Trial by Jury § 56 at
45-46 (cited in note 22).
' The medieval ordeals were not exactly the no-win propositions we might associate
with, for example, witch trials of the Inquisition, in which the only two outcomes were
death by the ordeal (followed by a pest-mortem declaration of innocence) or survival of
the ordeal (followed by a declaration of guilt and burning at the stake). Instead, if a de-
fendant survived the trial by ordeal, it was generally a sign of God's intervention, and
therefore of innocence, not a sign of demonic possession.
There were three principal English ordeals for serious crimes-hot iron, hot water,
and cold water. In the ordeal of hot iron, the accused was required to walk a specified dis-
tance carrying a piece of red-hot iron (or in some variations, to walk barefoot and blind-
folded over some red-hot surface). If the accused managed to avoid being burned, he was
declared innocent. If he was burned, he was declared guilty. In the ordeal of hot water,
the accused was required to reach his bare arm into a pail of boiling water and retrieve a
stone. Again, he was innocent only if God intervened to protect him from scalding. In the
ordeal of cold water, the accused was thrown into a pond or lake, usually after being
bound. Once again, he was innocent only if he managed to survive. See generally Black-
stone, 4 Commentaries at *337-38 (cited in note 9); von Moschzisker, Trial by Jury § 49 at
38-39 (cited in note 22).
For less serious crimes, unusual intervention by fate was seen as a sign of guilt, not
innocence. Thus, in the ordeal of the consecrated morsel, for example, the accused was
required to swallow a piece of bread accompanied by a prayer that he should choke if he
were guilty. Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at *345 (cited in note 9); von Moschzisker, Trial
by Jury § 50 at 39-40 (cited in note 22). Although this might appear to our modern hu-
manistic eyes as a rather unchallenging task, in 1194 the Earl of Kent actually choked to
death during the ordeal of the consecrated morsel, no doubt extending for many years the
public's faith in this mildest of the ordeals. Forsyth, History of Trial by Jury at 68 (cited
in note 22); Proffatt, Trial by Jury § 12 at 16 (cited in note 14).
Finally, although most medieval civil disputes were resolved either by battle, corn-
purgation, or jury, there were a few civil ordeals. For example, in the ordeal of the cross,
the opposing litigants were placed next to one another, each facing a cross, with arms
outstretched. He lost who dropped his arms first, von Moschzisker, Trial by Jury App 2 at
388 (cited in note 22). Readers who do civil litigation will recognize the spirit of this or-
deal in our current discovery practices.
' Thomas Andrew Green, Verdict According to Conscience: Perspectives on the Eng-
lish Criminal Trial Jury 1200-1800 11 (Chicago 1985); Moore, The Jury at 39 (cited in
note 13).
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Interestingly, it appears that in those rare instances when
juries were summoned, they were summoned to decide civil, not
criminal, cases.35 Indeed, shortly after the Conquest, William
himself convened civil juries in every English county to inquire
about laws relating to the ownership of lands. 5 William's son,
Henry I, expanded the practice of summoning juries to decide
particularly important civil disputes. 7
In 1166, Henry II proclaimed the Assize of Clarendon,1
which established a uniform system of juries, called "assizes," to
resolve real property disputes. It also banned trial by compurga-
tion for most felonies, and required most felony prosecutions to
proceed by ordeal.39 Even after the Assize of Clarendon, which is
generally recognized as the first significant historical marker in
the development of the English jury system, juries were almost
never used in criminal cases, and when they were, they were
available to the defendant only for a price.4°
As for the peremptory challenge, it was unknown at this
time. Indeed, by the end of the thirteenth century, when the oc-
casional criminal petit jury was convened after an indictment,
the trial was simply presented to the same large number of ju-
rors (twenty-four to eighty-four) who had acted as grand jurors,
all of whom were knights selected by the King.4 Over time, even
as English law reduced the number of grand jurors participating
in petit juries, and mechanisms developed for the selection of
petit jurors, there is no evidence of any peremptory challenge
system in place prior to the Magna Carta.
The Magna Carta did not guarantee the right to a jury,4" and
it had no effect on the rarity with which juries were summoned.43
Moore, The Jury at 39 (cited in note 13).
Id at 33.
Id at 34.
The Assize of Clarendon is also sometimes called the Grand Assize. Id.
Id at 37-38; Proffatt, Trial by Jury §§ 25-26 at 37-39 (cited in note 14).
Moore, The Jury at 49 (cited in note 13); von Moschzisker, Trial by Jury § 54 at 44-
45 (cited in note 22).
41 Moore, The Jury at 49-50, 53-54 (cited in note 13).
42 Cap 39 of the Magna Carta prohibited the Crown from imprisoning any free man
"unless by the lawful judgment of his peers." J.C. Holt, Magna Carta 327 (Cambridge
1965). Although its meaning has certainly expanded over time to encompass the right to
trial by jury, see, for example, Thompson v Utah, 170 US 343, 349-50 (1898), and Black-
stone, 4 Commentaries at *349 (cited in note 9), most scholars agree that this reference to
"peers" had contemporary feudal connotations only, and was not originally intended to
grant the right of trial by jury. As Professor Holt has summarized it:
[Parliament later] interpreted the phrase "lawful judgment of peers" to include trial
by peers and therefore to include trial by jury, a process which existed only in em-
bryo in 1215 .... Trial by jury was imposed from above, not sought from below, in
the later thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.
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Nor, of course, did it address the question of peremptory chal-
lenges. But the year 1215 saw an event much more significant to
the development of the English jury system than the Magna
Carta: Pope Innocent III forbade trials by ordeal.44 This ban,
which found its way into English law in 1219,4" left trial by jury
as the only practical alternative for deciding serious criminal
cases. By all indications, it was in the next fifty years, from 1220
to 1270, that the English jury began to flourish and weave itself
into the fabric of the common law.46
It was also at some unspecified time in this golden founda-
tional age of the English jury trial that the notion of peremptory
challenge appears rather suddenly to have taken root, first in
capital cases, and with the Crown having an unlimited number of
peremptory challenges. As discussed in more detail below, the
Crown's unlimited peremptory challenges were actually chal-
lenges for cause, which, because of the doctrine of royal infalli-
bility, were irrebuttably presumed to be well-taken.4"
In an almost immediate response to these unlimited prosecu-
torial peremptories, courts began to permit defendants to exer-
cise some peremptories in capital cases. This response was as
complete as it was rapid. By 1300, just thirty to eighty years af-
ter prosecutorial peremptory challenges first sprouted in Eng-
land, it was settled as a matter of common law that in all capital
cases the Crown had an unlimited number of peremptory chal-
Holt, Magna Carta at 9 & n 3 (citations omitted). See also Dawson, A History of Lay
Judges at 289-90 (cited in note 28); Plucknett, A Concise History at 24 (cited in note 14).
Some have argued that language in Cap 36 of the Magna Carta ("henceforth nothing
shall be given or taken for the writ of inquisition of life or limb, but it shall be given
freely, and shall not be denied") actually guarantees the right to jury trial, interpreting
the reference to "inquisition" to mean 'jury," in the manner directly descendant from the
Frankish "inquisitos." Moore, The Jury at 49 (cited in note 13). See also note 28. It seems
to me that this suggestion, though clever, is also belied by the sheer rarity of the criminal
jury trial throughout the first few decades of the thirteenth century. See note 40.
Moore, The Jury at 48-50 (cited in note 13).
This pronouncement was contained in Pope Innocent III's Fourth Lateran Council.
Plucknett, A Concise History at 118 (cited in note 14). The ordeal seems to have fallen
into theological disfavor not because the clergy thought the affairs of man too important
to be judged by such processes, but rather quite the contrary. As Proffatt has put it, "[tihe
clergy had never given their unqualified assent to the ordeal; they had been the means of
its gradual disuse, as they deemed it an impious reference to Heaven." Proffatt, Trial by
Jury § 28 at 41-42 (cited in note 14) (citation omitted). In addition, some reform-minded
clergymen objected to the ordeal's potential for corruption, especially given the fact that
one noteworthy priest candidly admitted that he felt a moral duty to assist in achieving a
"correct" result. Plucknett, A Concise History at 114-15 (cited in note 14).
' Plucknett, A Concise History at 119 & n 1 (cited in note 14).
Professor Green has described the fifty years following the Assize of Clarendon in
1166 as "the foundation period of the English common law." Green, Verdict According to
Conscience at 11 (cited in note 34).
' See text accompanying notes 173-82.
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lenges and the defendant had thirty-five." Although most felo-
nies in this period were punishable by death,49 there is also some
indication that peremptory challenges may have been permitted
in the rare non-capital felony case as well."
But these early stirrings of what eventually developed into
the modern peremptory challenge are far from clear. Even after
defendants were extended the royal prerogative of challenging
jurors without having to state why, the early English peremptory
challenge may actually have been a hybrid of what today we call
the peremptory challenge and the challenge for cause. Some
commentators have suggested that in small English villages and
towns, where lawyers, judges, and jurors all knew each other
well, and might even have known non-gentried defendants, the
so-called peremptory challenge may have been simply a short-
hand way of challenging a juror whom all participants recognized
was actually disqualified for cause." If these early peremptory
challenges were in fact a kind of unstated challenge for cause,
then they had nothing whatever to do with the modern idea of
eliminating jurors with hidden biases. On the contrary, thir-
teenth-century jurors were excused for biases so obvious that
they needed no articulation.
This characterization is certainly consistent with the idea
that in the beginning the Crown's unlimited peremptory chal-
lenges were in fact challenges for cause made by agents of a sup-
posedly infallible King.2 Thus, these early hybrid peremptories
' Proffatt, Trial by Jury § 155 at 207 (cited in note 14).
•' Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at *98 (cited in note 9). Dickens lamented that, even
as late as the French Revolution, English law imposed the death sentence for virtually
every offense:
[Plutting to death was a recipe much in vogue with all trades and professions, and
not least of all with Tellson's [Bank]. Death is Nature's remedy for all things, and
why not Legislation's? Accordingly, the forger was put to Death; the utterer of a bad
note was put to Death; the unlawful opener of a letter was put to Death; the pur-
loiner of forty shillings and six pence was put to Death; the holder of a horse at Tell-
son's door, who made off with it, was put to Death; the coiner of a bad shilling was
put to Death; the sounders of three-fourths of the notes in the whole gamut of Crime
were put to Death.
Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities 62 (Signet 1960).
This point was made by the Supreme Court in Swain v Alabama, 380 US 202, 212
n 9 (1965).
51 Alschuler, 56 U Chi L Rev at 165 n 51 (cited in note 1). Even though English jurors
in this time period did not have to be "impartial" in the modem sense, see text accompa-
nying notes 22-25 and 182-85, there was a well established if somewhat limited doctrine
of disqualification for cause, grounded primarily in a juror's relationship to any litigant by
blood, marriage, or economic interest. Jon M. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures: Our
Uncertain Commitment to Representative Panels 141 (Ballinger 1977).
' See text accompanying notes 173-78.
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may well have been challenges for cause in both of these senses-
exercised first by prosecutors still cloaked in the garb of royal in-
fallibility, and later by prosecutors and defense lawyers who
knew the prospective jurors so well that their unspoken asser-
tions of cause went unchallenged.
Another factor muddying the early history of the peremptory
challenge is that even though it was firmly rooted in the common
law by no later than 1305, when Parliament first officially recog-
nized it (though, ironically, by outlawing its use by the Crown),"
the actual use of the peremptory challenge in English criminal
trials appears almost nonexistent over its entire seven-hundred-
year history, and rare even at its zenith. It was so rare, in fact,
that some scholars believe that for its first five hundred years
the peremptory challenge was simply unavailable in ordinary
criminal trials. 4 An exhaustive examination of English jury rec-
ords in the last half of the fourteenth century uncovered no trace
of any peremptory challenges.55 A similar study covering the
eighteenth century reported that even at that late date peremp-
tory challenges were "rarely used."56 Even in modern times, when
perceived abuses eventually led to the complete abolition of the
peremptory challenge in England," its use, as late as 1979, had
been described as no more frequent than one in seven trials,
rarely with more than one peremptory challenge in a case." The
historical summary that follows, therefore, must be understood
in this overarching context: the actual exercise of the English
peremptory challenge has always been a rare occurrence.
It was intolerable to Parliament that the Crown should not
only continue its practice of handpicking all prospective jurors,
but then be given an unlimited number of peremptory challenges
to boot. In 1305, Parliament outlawed entirely the Crown's right
to any peremptories, while leaving intact a criminal defendant's
common law right to thirty-five. 9 But the King's courts quickly
See text accompanying note 59.
J.B. Post, Jury Lists and Juries In The Late Fourteenth Century, in J.S. Cockburn
and Thomas A. Green, eds, Twelve Good Men and True: The Criminal Trial Jury in Eng-
land 1200-1800 71 (Princeton 1988).
C Id.
P.J.R. King, 'Illiterate Plebians, Easily Misled: Jury Composition, Experience, and
Behaviour in Essex, 1735-1815, in Cockburn and Green, Twelve Good Men at 277-78
(cited in note 54).
17 See text accompanying notes 66-67.
" John Baldwin and Michael McConville, Jury Trials 92-93 (Clarendon 1979). The
modern use of peremptory challenges in London may have been somewhat more frequent
than in other parts of England. Id at 93 n 15.
E-1 See Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at *353 (cited in note 9), citing Ordinance for In-
quests, 33 Edw 1 (1305) (Eng). See also Forsyth, History of Trial at 192 (cited in note 22).
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sidestepped this law by adopting a common law procedure called
"standing aside," under which the Crown's prosecutors could di-
rect any number of prospective jurors to "stand aside" pending
selection from all the remaining jurors. If, after each side had ex-
ercised all its challenges for cause and the defendant had exer-
cised his peremptories, the number of remaining jurors was in-
sufficient to seat a jury, then and only then would the prospec-
tive jurors who were standing aside be recalled. Thus, for all
practical purposes, the Crown retained its right to an unlimited
number of peremptory challenges. 0
From 1305 forward, the number of peremptory challenges
allowed in English criminal trials steadily decreased. A defen-
dant's peremptories were reduced from thirty-five to twenty in
1530,61 to seven in 1948,62 to three in 1977,63 and were eliminated
entirely in 1989.64 Although the Crown's right to ask jurors to
stand aside remained theoretically available until 1989, it is
clear that the standing aside procedure was just as rare, and
perhaps rarer, than the defendant's exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges.65
After a series of highly publicized criminal trials in the
1980s, in which defense counsel's use of the peremptory chal-
lenge was widely seen as abusive, Parliament abolished all per-
emptory challenges effective January 5, 1989.6 Perhaps nothing
is more telling of the restrained manner in which the English
have exercised the peremptory challenge than the fact that in the
most publicized of these trials, the Cyprus spy trial, all seven de-
fendants pooled their peremptory challenges and exercised a
grand total of seven.17
"Proffatt, Trial by Jury § 160 at 212-13 (cited in note 14).
1 22 Hen 8, ch 14 § 6 (1530) (Eng). See also 6 Geo 4, ch 50 § 29 (1825).
11 & 12 Geo 6, ch 58 § 35 (1948).
The Criminal Law Act, 1977, ch 45 § 43 (Eng).
The Criminal Justice Act, 1988, ch 33 § 118(1) (Eng).
Baldwin and McConville, Jury Trials at 93 n 15 (cited in note 58).
The Criminal Justice Act, 1988, ch 33 § 118(1) (Eng). That same year, the Attorney
General also abolished the practice of standing aside, except in extraordinary circum-
stances. See Peter Allsop, ed, Current Law Statutes Annotated 33:139-40 (Sweet & Max-
well 1988).
Broderick, 65 Temple L Rev at 373 n 17 (cited in note 2), quoting Sean Enright, Re-
viving the Challenge for Cause, New L J 9 (Jan 6, 1989):
[Abolition of the peremptory challenge was] the result of a sustained campaign in
Parliament and in the press alleging that defence counsel were systematically
abusing it. In multi-handed trials, it was said, counsel were pooling challenges to
"pack" juries with individuals who were likely to acquit. The Cyprus spy trial was of-
ten cited as an example. In that instance seven jurors were challenged by defence
counsel acting together. The jury, all young and male, acquitted all seven defen-
dants. This case more than any other represented a watershed in the campaign to
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C. The Peremptory Challenge in the United States
Peremptory challenges have fared much better in this coun-
try than in England. Most American colonial courts accepted the
English common law practice of giving a criminal defendant
some peremptory challenges.8 The colonial courts, however,
disagreed on whether the prosecution should be given any per-
emptory challenges, whether by "standing aside" or otherwise.
Some colonies permitted an unlimited number of prosecution
peremptories, others allowed none.6"
A defendant has no constitutional right to peremptory chal-
lenges,"0 and indeed the peremptory challenge was not the sub-
ject of any reported discussion by the framers, formal or infor-
mal. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution secures the right to
a jury in all federal criminal trials,' but makes no mention of the
peremptory challenge. There is no record of any discussion of the
peremptory challenge in the context of Article III, Section 2, ei-
ther prior to or during ratification. Indeed, there was surprisingly
little discussion of the right to jury trial itself, let alone peremp-
tory challenges. Randolph's original draft of Article III had no
provision guaranteeing either criminal or civil juries.12 The cur-
rent provision guaranteeing criminal juries was added by com-
mittee, and was accepted at the convention with no recorded de-
bate or dissent. 3 Although there was a great deal of debate on
the question of judicial review of jury verdicts, '4 and also on the
question of whether the federal venire should be drawn, as Arti-
cle III, Section 1, now provides, from a unit as large as a whole
state, 6 the only significant pre-ratification discussion of the right
to trial by jury was Hamilton's explanation in Federalist 83 for
abolish the challenge, even though critics overlooked the fact that the entire jury
panel summoned for the trial had been vetted for the prosecution by Special Branch
and MIS.
Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures at 148 (cited in note 51).
Id at 148-49, 171 n 46.
See text accompanying notes 81-82.
US Const, Art III, § 2, cl 3 provides:
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such
Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed;
but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places
as the Congress may by Law have directed.
72 Saul K. Padover, To Secure These Blessings 419 (Washington Square 1962).
Id.
See, for example, Federalist 81 (Hamilton), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist
Papers 489-90 (Mentor 1961); Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures at 7 (cited in note 51).
' Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures at 7 (cited in note 51). See also US Const, Art
I,§ 1.
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why Article III, Section 2, secures the right to jury only in crimi-
nal cases and not civil cases.76
It was not until the Sixth Amendment was proposed that ju-
ror challenges began to be discussed by the framers, although
even those discussions were hardly extensive, and they all ap-
pear to have been limited to the challenge for cause. At least one
early draft of the Sixth Amendment expressly provided that a de-
fendant had a right to challenges for cause.77 In arguing that this
specific reference should be deleted, Madison himself took the
position that such a reference was unnecessary because the
challenge for cause was inherent in the concept of an impartial
jury.78 Others, including Patrick Henry, denounced the proposal
to delete the reference to challenges for cause. 9 In the end, of
course, it was deleted from the final version of the Sixth
Amendment."
' Federalist 83 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, Federalist Papers at 495-99 (cited in note
74).
, Valerie P. Hans and Neil Vidmar, Judging the Jury 37 (Plenum 1986), quoting the
very first draft of the Sixth Amendment, which provided in pertinent part that the right
to an impartial jury would include "the right of challenge and other accustomed requi-
sites."
" Id. Madison's actual words as reported in the Virginia ratification debates were:
Where a technical word was used [trial by jury], all the incidents belonging to it nec-
essarily attended it. The right to challenge is incident to the trial by jury, and, there-
fore, as one is secured, so is the other.
Id.
If [the people] dare oppose the hands of tyrannical power, you will see what has
happened elsewhere. They may be tried by the most partial powers, by their most
implacable enemies, and be sentenced and put to death, with all the forms of a fair
trial.... I would rather the trial by jury were struck out altogether. There is no
right of challenging partial jurors.... Yet the right is as valuable as the trial by jury
itself.
Id.
, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and pub-
lic trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed .... US Const, Amend VI. There is arguably some ambiguity in the framers'
Sixth Amendment debate over "challenges," owing to the then-colonial practice, and the
current English practice, of sometimes referring to both peremptory challenges and chal-
lenges for cause with the single word "challenges." Judge Broderick appears to view this
debate between Madison and Henry as encompassing the peremptory challenge. Broder-
ick, 65 Temple L Rev at 374 nn 28-29 (cited in note 2). Nevertheless, it seems clear, at
least from the context in which Professors Hans and Vidmar have reported this debate,
that it was about the challenge for cause, and not about the peremptory challenge:
A[n] issue of contention concerned the spelling out of the right to challenge jurors.
As we already noted, English law did not allow challenges for general bias. The
House of Representatives was, however, very specific on this right in its first draft of
the Bill of Rights.... The Senate eliminated this clause, largely on the grounds that
it was redundant with the guarantee of an "impartial jury."
[64:809
Peremptory Challenges
By contrast, I am unaware of any recorded discussion by the
framers of the peremptory challenge, or of any draft of any con-
stitutional provision-original or amendment-referencing the
peremptory challenge. The Constitution is and always has been
utterly silent when it comes to the peremptory challenge.8'
In 1919, the Supreme Court held in Stilson v United States
that "[tihere is nothing in the Constitution of the United States
which requires the Congress to grant peremptory challenges to
defendants in criminal cases; trial by an impartial jury is all that
is secured." 2
But Congress quite early on codified portions of the English
practice regarding peremptory challenges. In 1790, it directed
that a federal criminal defendant would be given thirty-five per-
emptories in treason cases and twenty in all other capital cases."
This statute did not address the question of a defendant's right to
peremptory challenges in non-capital federal cases. Nor did it
make any mention of the prosecution's peremptories, or of the
English practice of standing aside, thus leaving the federal courts
with the open question of whether the prosecution had any com-
mon law right to peremptory challenges in either form.
Before 1856, the general belief and practice seems to have
been that the prosecution did have a right to some peremptory
challenges, and perhaps even to an unlimited number via the
practice of standing aside, presumably as a matter of federal
common law." That idea was rejected by the Supreme Court in
Mhese debates indicated that, unlike English practice, it was intended that in a
pretrial hearing, or voir dire, as it was called, defendants should have the right to
challenge and reject jurors for their general attitudes as well as specific interests in
the case.
Hans and Vidmar, Judging the Jury at 37-38 (cited in note 77) (citation omitted).
" See US Const, Amend VI. The Seventh Amendment, which guarantees the right to
a jury in most federal civil cases, similarly does not make any mention of the peremptory
challenge. US Const, Amend VII.
250 US 583, 586 (1919).
1 Stat 119 (1790).
This position was taken by Justice Story, in dictum, in United States v Marchant,
25 US (12 Wheat) 480, 483-84 (1827). Presumably in no small part due to Justice Story's
prestige, this view was accepted by most federal judges until the Court revisited the issue
in United States v Shackleford, 59 US (18 How) 588 (1856). Van Dyke, Jury Selection
Procedures at 149 (cited in note 51). But see United States v Douglass, 25 F Cas 896, 900
(C C NY 1851) (Betts dissenting):
The whole theory of criminal jurisprudence looks to placing the advantage, if one ac-
companies the cause, on the side of the accused; and I think that, after the efforts
almost universally put forth in the United States to strengthen and extend such
privilege, particularly to a person on trial for his life, we are taking a long step
backwards in setting up the practice of the English assizes, originating in an era of
colder sympathy for human life than prevails in our era and in the jurisprudence of
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1856 in United States v Shackleford, which held that neither the
prosecutor's peremptory challenge nor the right to direct jurors
to stand aside was rooted in federal common law, and that fed-
eral courts should instead look to state procedures to decide
whether to allow the prosecution peremptory challenges or
standing aside.85
In 1865, in response to Shackleford, Congress specified that
in all non-capital felony cases the defendant would have ten per-
emptory challenges and the prosecution two.8 6 In this same stat-
ute Congress decreased the number of defense peremptories in
capital cases from thirty-five to twenty, and granted the prosecu-
tion five. 7 In 1872, the number of prosecution challenges in non-
treason, non-capital felony cases was increased from two to
three." In the same statute, Congress for the first time extended
the notion of peremptory challenges to federal civil cases (three
for each side) and to federal misdemeanor cases (three for each
side).8 9 In 1911, the numbers were again revised: twenty for the
defendant and six for the prosecution in treason and other capi-
tal cases; ten for the defendant and six for the prosecution in
other felony cases; three each in misdemeanor and civil cases."
When the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were adopted in
1946, Rule 24(b) increased the prosecution's peremptories in
capital cases to equal the defendant's at twenty."' This is the cur-
rent federal scheme.
the United States.
59 US (18 How) 588, 590 (1856).
13 Stat 500 (1865).
87 Id.
8 17 Stat 282 (1872).
SId.
36 Stat 1166 (1911).
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(b) provides:
If the offense charged is punishable by death, each side is entitled to 20 peremptory
challenges. If the offense charged is punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year, the government is entitled to 6 peremptory challenges and the defendant or de-
fendants jointly to 10 peremptory challenges. If the offense charged is punishable by
imprisonment for not more than one year or by fine or both, each side is entitled to 3
peremptory challenges. If there is more than one defendant, the court may allow the
defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised sepa-
rately or jointly.
Peremptory challenges in federal civil trials are established in 28 USC § 1870 (1994):
In civil cases, each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges. Several
defendants or several plaintiffs may be considered as a single party for the purposes
of making challenges, or the court may also allow additional peremptory challenges
and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly.
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The evolution of the peremptory challenge in the various
states has generally paralleled federal developments. By 1790,
most states recognized by statute a defendant's right to some
peremptory challenges, and most state courts shared the pre-
Shackleford federal view that the prosecution's right to some
peremptories was grounded in the common law.92 By 1870-only
fourteen years after the Court in Shackleford rejected the notion
of a common law basis for a prosecutor's right to peremptory
challenges-almost all the states had enacted statutory provi-
sions granting the prosecution some peremptories.93 Today, every
state recognizes some form of peremptory challenges for both
sides in criminal and civil cases.94
D. The Peremptory Challenge as the Last Best Tool of Jim
Crow
Like so many things in the United States, the marked differ-
ence between the American peremptory challenge and the Eng-
lish peremptory challenge can be traced to the agonies of slavery,
civil war, and Reconstruction. While the English version of the
peremptory challenge was withering from disuse, the American
version was vigorously and comprehensively being applied in at-
tempts to stem the inevitable tide of civil rights.
Until Reconstruction, the peremptory challenge does not ap-
pear to have been used extensively to exclude disfavored racial or
ethnic groups, probably for the simple reason that, as in Eng-
land, those groups were excluded quite effectively at the front
end by restrictive laws on juror qualification.95 In America, this
' See Swain v Alabama, 380 US 202, 215-17 & nn 16-20 (1965). Of course, even after
Stilson and Shackleford, state courts were free to hold that a prosecutor's right to per-
emptory challenges was guaranteed by the state constitution, though rve found no such
reported cases. See State v Kelly, 362 S2d 1071, 1081-82 (La 1978) (Dennis concurring)
(Louisiana Constitution has never recognized prosecutor's right to peremptory chal-
lenges).
' Swain, 380 US at 216 n 18. Interestingly, the slave states were first to enact stat-
utes giving the peremptory challenge to the prosecution, with Alabama and Georgia
leading the way in 1820 and 1833, respectively. Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Chal-
lenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory
Challenges, 76 Cornell L Rev 1, 11 n 39 (1990). The first northern state to give the per-
emptory challenge to the prosecution was Rhode Island, in 1854. Id.
Morehead, 43 DePaul L Rev at 628 & n 23 (cited in note 2).
" As late as the eighteenth century, jury service in England was limited to male free-
holders under seventy years of age, and even 75 percent of that elite group was insuffi-
ciently wealthy to qualify. Douglas Hay, The Class Composition of the Palladium of Lib-
erty: Trial Jurors in the Eighteenth Century, Cockburn and Green, eds, Twelve Good Men
at 305, 349, 357 (cited in note 54). In a sample of 181 defendants tried in Staffordshire in
a single year in the 1700s, only 2 percent would themselves have qualified as jurors, and
none of those charged with felonies or theft would have qualified. Id at 350-51.
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front-end exclusion was accomplished not only by slave codes in
the South, and even express disenfranchisement of free blacks in
the North, but also by a myriad of facially neutral barriers to ju-
ror qualification that were erected in both the South and North. 6
Since juror qualification was initially tied to voter qualification,
the de jure and de facto disenfranchisement of blacks served also
to exclude them as jurors. 7
Emancipation did not markedly change the situation. The
boldest states simply reenacted the slave codes.98 Most states, by
enacting the so-called Black Codes, either retained their express
racial barriers or retained their power to exclude blacks and oth-
ers with a variety of qualifications (for example, poll taxes, prop-
erty ownership, educational background, residence).9 Just in
case any undesirables managed to slip through these objective
economic barriers, most states also erected a second line of de-
fense consisting of wholly subjective "character" qualifications
("intelligence," "approved integrity," "good character"), to be de-
termined by local officials in the course of putting together lists
of prospective jurors.10 Finally, many states expressly or im-
pliedly adopted the so-called "key man" method of summoning
jurors, in which a designated county official-usually one who
was politically well-connected-was charged with making all of
the qualification decisions and putting together all of the jury
lists. °'
As the engine of Reconstruction began to drive the last ves-
tiges of express racial barriers to jury service out of the state law
codes, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which crimi-
' Slaves, of course, had no right to vote and no right to serve on juries. Even free
blacks were expressly disenfranchised in Delaware in 1792, in Kentucky, Maryland and
Ohio in 1799, and in New Jersey in 1807. Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of
Brown v. Board of Education and Black America's Struggle for Equality 32 (Vintage
1977). Even in states where slavery was not practiced but also not outlawed, free blacks
were generally afforded voting rights, and therefore jury eligibility, see note 97, only after
meeting unrealistic and discriminatory qualifications. Id at 38. For example, black citi-
zens in antebellum New York could vote, and therefore serve on a jury, only if they owned
at least $250 worth of property. No such requirement applied to whites. Id. See generally
Paul Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment: Black Legal Rights in the Ante-
bellum North, 17 Rutgers L J 414 (1986) (arguing that pre-Civil War era expanded civil
rights for blacks in the antebellum North).
Colbert, 76 Cornell L Rev at 31 n 140 (cited in note 93).
See, for example, An Act to confer Civil Rights on Freedmen, 1865 Miss Laws § 4 at
82, 83-86.
See Colbert, 76 Cornell L Rev at 76 (cited in note 93); Theodore Brantner Wilson,
The Black Codes of the South (Alabama 1965).
" Colbert, 76 Cornell L Rev at 75-77 (cited in note 93).
"Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures at 55 (cited in note 51). The "key man"
method of summoning jurors was expressly outlawed by Congress in 1968. See text ac-
companying notes 127-29.
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nalized any de jure exclusion of jurors based on race. °2 Still,
many southern states boldly continued to enforce state statutes
expressly excluding blacks from jury service. In Strauder v West
Virginia, the Supreme Court invalidated these de jure exclu-
sions.103 However, on the same day it decided Strauder, the Court
in Virginia v Rives refused to strike down a state's de facto ex-
clusion of blacks from juries, opining that state courts could ade-
quately redress a claim of de facto racial exclusion.' 4
Despite the presence of comprehensive patent and latent ex-
clusion mechanisms (not to mention widespread physical intimi-
dation o5) some southern blacks trickled through the system and
ended up as prospective jurors. Indeed, as early as 1870, inte-
grated venires-that is, panels of prospective jurors with at least
one black person in them-were not uncommon in several south-
ern states.0 6 Prosecutors were then forced to turn to the peremp-
tory challenge to eliminate the new black faces appearing for jury
duty.
From Reconstruction through the civil rights movement, the
peremptory challenge was an incredibly efficient final racial fil-
ter. When Mr. Swain, of Swain v Alabama17 fame, was convicted
by his all-white Talladega County jury in the early 1960s, no
black person had sat on any Talladega County trial jury, civil or
criminal, in living memory.' 8 No black person sat on any criminal
jury in Talladega County, trial jury or grand jury, for the thirteen
years immediately preceding Swain."9 In 1963, the Alabama Su-
preme Court itself summed up with chilling simplicity the Jim
Crow effectiveness of the peremptory challenge: "Negroes are
commonly on trial venires but are always struck by attorneys in
selecting the trial jury.""01 The systematic exclusion of black ju-
rors was not limited to the Deep South. For example, as late as
1880, no black person had ever served as a juror in Delaware."'
i18 Stat, Pt 3 at 335 (1875).
.100 US (10 Otto) 303, 309-10 (1879).
'" 100 US (10 Otto) 313, 318-22 (1879). A third jury rights case was decided on the
same day as Strauder and Rives. In Ex Parte Virginia, the Court affirmed the conviction
of a state trial judge under those provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat, Pt 3
at 335-36, which prohibited state officials from excluding jurors based on race. 100 US (10
Otto) 339, 347-48 (1879).
"'See generally Colbert, 76 Cornell L Rev at 39-42 (cited in note 93).
"C' Id at 49-50.
.07380 US 202 (1965). See text accompanying notes 120-31.
...Id at 231-32 (Goldberg dissenting).
"kId at 205 (majority opinion).
"Swain v State, 275 Ala 508, 156 S2d 368, 375 (1963), affd, 380 US 202 (1965).
.. Neal v Delaware, 103 US (13 Otto) 370, 397 (1880). It is difficult to say whether,
through the first half of this century, blacks in the North were just as effectively excluded
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The University of Chicago Law Review
It was against this backdrop of comprehensive and un-
abashed racial exclusion that the Supreme Court began its at-
tempts to defang the peremptory challenge as a tool of racial seg-
regation.
II. BATSON, ITS PREDECESSORS, AND ITS PROGENY: THE
PEREMPTORY Is No LONGER PEREMPTORY
The Supreme Court has traveled a long road from a sugges-
tion it made in an 1887 case that peremptory challenges serve
the useful function of screening out "criminal classes" in "large
cities [where] there is such a mixed population.""2 Today, the law
forbids purposeful racial, ethnic, and gender discrimination in
the exercise of peremptory challenges."' The length of that road,
the pace of the journey, and the uncertainties of where it will
eventually lead all reflect a deeply ambivalent view of the impor-
tance of the peremptory challenge. They also reflect the extent to
which the peremptory challenge once was, and now may again
be, a tool to prevent impartial juries rather than to ensure them.
A. The Road to Batson
The first significant step in this journey was Neal v Dela-
ware, an 1880 decision in which the Court recognized for the first
time that state juror qualification laws had constitutional limits,
and could not be used to effect a total exclusion of black jurors
over a substantial period of time."' This standard, of course, was
an exceedingly difficult one for a complaining defendant to meet:
not only did it require a showing of total exclusion of minority ju-
rors from venires, it required that a defendant demonstrate that
the exclusion pervaded over a "substantial" period of time-that
is, in prior venires in that jurisdiction. Thus, Neal had the para-
doxical effect of invigorating the peremptory challenge as a tool
of racial exclusion: many states that still had highly restrictive
juror qualifications relaxed those qualifications to permit a token
number of blacks into jury venires, and those blacks were then
excluded by peremptory challenges."5
from jury service as their southern brethren. There is almost no information about the
racial characteristics of northern juries during that period. Colbert, 76 Cornell L Rev at
88-89 & n 438 (cited in note 93).
"Hayes v Missouri, 120 US 68, 71 (1887).
" See text accompanying notes 132-41.
... 103 US (13 Otto) 370, 397 (1880).
"'Several states unabashedly adopted procedures of admitting a few token blacks in
every trial venire and grand jury for the specific purpose of insulating themselves from
Neal. See, for example, Cassell v Texas, 339 US 282, 286 (1950) (noting in dicta that jury
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Even in the face of Neal, some states, such as Alabama, re-
fused to relent on their comprehensive de facto exclusion of black
jurors, explaining their absence as the benign product of state of-
ficials' application of facially-neutral qualifications. In Norris v
Alabama, the Court held that such an explanation for the total
absence of black jurors was not constitutionally adequate,"6 and
that the Court would make an independent inquiry into whether
a particular state's jury qualifications amounted to purposeful
discrimination under Neal."7
This promise proved greatly exaggerated. Only a handful of
Supreme Court decisions struck down any system of state jury
qualifications under the stringent standards of Norris and
Neal."8 States continued to enforce facially neutral de facto ex-
clusions, and state court venires continued to be overwhelmingly
white."9
By the time the Court decided Swain v Alabama"---the
1965 case in which the Supreme Court addressed for the first
time the issue of juror discrimination in the context of the per-
emptory challenge-the peremptory challenge was well en-
trenched as the last line of defense against the increasing pres-
sures for desegregation of the venire. The Swain Court held that
the Equal Protection Clause prohibited state prosecutors from
using their peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory
way. But in order to overcome the presumption that peremptory
challenges were exercised legitimately, a defendant had to dem-
onstrate that the prosecutor had "systematically" used perempto-
ries to exclude black jurors. 2' This required something more than
the mere fact that all blacks had been excluded in the case at
hand, but presumably something less than the "total" exclusion
over a "substantial" period of time as required in Neal.2 '
commissioner customarily permitted only one black juror on each grand jury).
1G 294 US 587, 596-99 (1935).
117 Id at 589-90:
The question is of the application of this established principle [of Neal v Delaware] to
the facts disclosed by the record. That the question is one of fact does not relieve us
of the duty to determine whether in truth a federal right has been denied.
.Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures at 54-56 (cited in note 51).
..For example, although nearly half of the 80,000 people living in Bibbs County,
Georgia in 1940 were black, only 44 of 2,493 (1.8 percent) of the people summoned for
jury duty in that year were black. Watkins v State, 199 Ga 81, 33 SE2d 325, 333 (1945).
' 380 US 202.
' Id at 227.
"=Justice White's majority opinion starts out sounding a lot like Norris and Neal:
[Wihen the prosecutor in a county, in case after case, whatever the circumstances,
whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible
for the removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors by the jury
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In practice, the Swain standard proved every bit as daunting
as the Neal standard. Indeed, the proof problems inherent in the
Neal inquiry were magnified by Swain, since it can be substan-
tially more difficult to gather evidence about, and make infer-
ences from, a prosecutor's past practices in exercising peremp-
tory challenges than to simply collect hard and cold racial data
from county jury records. To no one's surprise, Swain had no
more impact on eliminating the racially-motivated use of per-
emptory challenges than Neal had on eliminating racially-
motivated juror disqualifications. 2 '
Swain endured an unprecedented barrage of academic and
judicial criticism, almost all condemning its naive view of the
subtleties of racial discrimination and the cleverness of its prose-
cutorial practitioners.12 Some lower federal courts and state
courts even turned to the Sixth Amendment (or to state equiva-
lents), holding that the fair cross-section requirement of the
Sixth Amendment applied to the make-up of the jury, not just to
the venire, and invalidating the racial effects of peremptory
challenges on this ultimately rejected constitutional ground. 25
commissioners and who have survived challenges for cause, with the result that no
Negroes ever served on petit juries, the Fourteenth Amendment claim takes on
added significance.... If the State has not seen fit to leave a single Negro on any
jury in a criminal case, the presumption protecting the prosecutor may well be over-
come.
Id at 223-24 (citation omitted). But later he makes it clear that something less than total
exclusion over all time need be proved: "[Tihe defendant must, to pose the issue, show the
prosecutor's systematic use of peremptory challenges against Negroes over a period of
time." Id at 227.
'Bray, Comment, 40 UCLA L Rev at 527-31 (cited in note 1) (noting that exercise of
peremptory challenges resulted in impermissible discrimination even after Swain). See
also Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures at 58-62 (cited in note 51) (noting that later
Court opinions undercut force of Swain).
'See, for example, Swain, 380 US at 246 (Goldberg dissenting) (arguing that Swain
condones discriminatory procedures); People v Wheeler, 148 Cal Rptr 890, 583 P2d 748,
766-68 (Cal 1978) (same); Gurney, Note, 21 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 240 (cited in note 2)
(observing that Swain standard is "all but impossible to satisfy"); Van Dyke, Jury Selec-
tion Procedures at 57-58 (cited in note 51) (arguing that Swain is inconsistent with earlier
and later Court decisions).
'See, for example, Booker v Jabe, 775 F2d 762, 767-68 (6th Cir 1985); Roman v
Abrams, 822 F2d 214, 224-25 (2d Cir 1987); Wheeler, 583 P2d at 761-62 (Cal 1978); Riley v
State, 496 A2d 997, 1008 (Del 1985); State v Neil, 457 S2d 481, 486 (Fla 1984); Common-
wealth v Soares, 377 Mass 461, 387 NE2d 499, 510-16 (1979). But several courts declined
to extend the fair cross-section requirement from the venire to the sitting jury. See, for
example, State v Stewart, 225 Kan 410, 591 P2d 166, 171-72 (1979); State v Raymond, 446
A2d 743, 745 (RI 1982).
The Supreme Court eventually resolved this conflict post-Batson, at least as a federal
matter, in favor of the view that the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amend-
ment is limited to the procedures by which the venire is drawn, and does not apply to the
procedures by which the jury is then selected from that venire. Holland v Illinois, 493 US
474, 477-88 (1990).
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Other state courts constructed less demanding versions of the
Swain test that were grounded on state equal protection provi-
sions.'26
In response to Swain, Congress enacted the Jury Selection
and Service Act of 1968,12' which expressly forbade the "key man"
method of selection of the venire,"' and required instead that
each federal district court appoint a jury selection commissioner
who would then devise a plan for the summoning of prospective
jurors from voter lists and other sources expressly designed to
maximize a fair cross-section. The statute also expressly prohib-
ited the exclusion of federal jurors on account of race, color, re-
ligion, sex, national origin, or economic status.'29
The Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules
even joined the fray, proposing in 1976 that Rule 24(b) be
amended to reduce significantly the number of peremptory chal-
lenges for each side, on the ground that the large number of ex-
isting peremptory challenges were sometimes being misused "to
make systematic exclusions of a class of persons.""' The proposed
rule change was approved by the Court but never adopted by
Congress.' 3'
B. Batson and the Problem of Pretext
The Court finally acted in Batson v Kentucky,"2 abandoning
the Swain requirement that there be broad historical evidence of
racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges,
and permitting a defendant to focus instead on the prosecutor's
motivations in the case at hand. Batson held that a defendant
could overcome the presumption that peremptory challenges
were used legitimately by making a prima facie case that the
challenges in the case at hand were race-motivated (Batson step
one), after which the burden would then shift to the prosecutor to
articulate a race-neutral reason for the challenges (Batson step
' See, for example, Wheeler, 583 P2d at 758-62; Soares, 387 NE2d at 510-16. But see
Commonwealth v Henderson, 497 Pa 23, 438 A2d 951, 952-55 (1981) (rejecting the ap-
proach taken in Wheeler and Soares).
28 USC §§ 1861-69 (1988).
'"See text accompanying note 101. See also Davis v United States, 411 US 233, 235
(1973) (discussing eradication of "key man" system).
28 USC § 1862 (1994).
"Notes of Advisory Committee on March 1990 Proposed Amendment to Rules, Rule
24, reported in USCS Rules 14-31 at 339 (1991).
.'Id. In March 1990, the Advisory Committee again proposed a substantial reduction
in the number of federal peremptory challenges, and an equalization (at six) of the num-
ber for each side in non-capital felony cases. Id. No action on this proposal has been re-
ported.
1"476 US 79 (1986).
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two).'33 If a race-neutral reason were proffered, then the final
step would be for the trial court to determine whether the chal-
lenger had met his or her burden of proving that the peremptory
challenges were in fact exercised because of racial prejudice
(Batson step three).'
Despite another firestorm of criticism, beginning at one end
of the ideological spectrum with Justice Marshall's famous con-
currence expressing the view that peremptory challenges should
be abolished altogether,"5 and currently embodied at the other
end of the ideological spectrum in Justice Scalia's dissents in
Edmonson v Leesville Concrete Co"3 6 and J.E.B. v Alabama,' the
=[A] defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in se-
lection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of
peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial. To establish such a case, the defen-
dant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the
prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members
of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to
which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection
practice that permits "those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate." Fi-
nally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circum-
stances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the
veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.
Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to
come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors.
476 US at 96-97 (citations omitted).
' Once a race-neutral explanation is given, "[t]he trial court then will have the duty
to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination." Id at 98.
'The decision today will not end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject
into the jury-selection process. That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating
peremptory challenges entirely.
The inherent potential of peremptory challenges to distort the jury process by per-
mitting the exclusion of jurors on racial grounds should ideally lead the Court to ban
them entirely from the criminal justice system. Justice Goldberg, dissenting in
Swain, emphasized that "[w]ere it necessary to make an absolute choice between the
right of a defendant to have a jury chosen in conformity with the requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the right to challenge peremptorily, the Constitution
compels a choice of the former." I believe that this case presents just such a choice,
and I would resolve that choice by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely in
criminal cases.
476 US at 102-03, 107 (Marshall concurring) (citations omitted).
13 [T]oday's decision means that both sides, in all civil jury cases, no matter what
their race (and indeed, even if they are artificial entities such as corporations), may
lodge racial-challenge objections and, after those objections have been considered
and denied, appeal the denials-with the consequence, if they are successful, of
having the judgments then overturned. Thus, yet another complexity is added to an
increasingly Byzantine system ofjustice that devotes more and more of its energy to
sideshows and less and less to the merits of the case.
500 US 614, 645 (1991) (Scalia dissenting).
.. Women were categorically excluded from juries because of doubt that they were
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Batson rule has survived, and in some sense has flourished. It
now applies regardless of the race of the defendant or the race of
the challenged juror (Powers v Ohio);3 it applies in civil cases as
well as criminal cases (Edmonson);".9 it applies to defense chal-
lenges as well as prosecution challenges (Georgia v McCollum);...
and it applies to challenges discriminating by gender (J.E.B.).14 1
Of all these extensions of the Batson doctrine, Powers and
McCollum are probably the most significant. They shifted the fo-
cus from a defendant's right not to have prospective jurors ex-
cluded because of race, to the rights of the prospective jurors not
to be so excluded. By explicitly recognizing that a prospective ju-
ror has a protectible interest in not being excused for unconstitu-
tional reasons, the Court added another constitutional right to
those already in tension with the nonconstitutional system of
peremptory challenges. It also raised the specter of a generalized
equal protection attack on the very existence of the peremptory
challenge: If a prospective juror has a right not to be excluded for
constitutionally impermissible reasons, does he or she not also
have a right not to be excluded for reasons which, by definition,
cannot be rationally articulated? It is an odd constitutional right
indeed which cannot be taken away for certain reasons, but
which can freely be taken away for a universe of other unstated
and unstatable reasons.4 1 It is also an odd constitutional right
competent; women are stricken from juries by peremptory challenge because of
doubt that they are well disposed to the striking party's case. There is discrimination
and dishonor in the former, and not in the latter-which explains the 106-year in-
terlude between our holding that exclusion from juries on the basis of race was un-
constitutional, and our holding that peremptory challenges on the basis of race were
unconstitutional.
511 US 127, 160 (1994) (Scalia dissenting) (citations omitted).
1-499 US 400, 406-10, 415-16 (1991) (permitting a defendant to object to race-based
exclusion of jurors in peremptory challenges regardless of whether or not defendant
shares same race).
500 US at 618-28.
1505 US 42, 48-55 (1992).
14 511 US at 129.
... Many have argued that by recognizing a prospective juror's right not to be peremp-
torily excused for unconstitutional reasons, Powers and McCollum represent the first
ineluctable steps toward the conclusion that peremptory challenges are unconstitutional.
See, for example, Broderick, 65 Temple L Rev at 399-401, 420 (cited in note 2) (arguing
that peremptory challenges are at odds with Equal Protection); Harris, Note, 32 Wm &
Mary L Rev at 1034-39 (cited in note 2) (same). This Fourteenth Amendment argument
was made even before Powers and McCollum. See, for example, Alschuler, 56 U Chi L
Rev at 169-70, 201-09 (cited in note 1) (same). See also Note, Due Process Limits on
Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges, 102 Harv L Rev 1013, 1024-33 (1989) (recognizing a
due process test to detect prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges). But see Under-
wood, 92 Colum L Rev at 736-42 (cited in note 2) (evaluating due process right to trial by
jury).
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that can be taken away without explanation by a lawyer, but not
by a state legislature."
The mutations to Batson are probably far from over. The
Court has begun to address the looming and perhaps intractable
problem of pretext, most recently holding in Purkett v Elem that
after a prima facie case of discrimination is made out, and the
burden shifts to the challenger to show a race-neutral reason,
that reason need only be race-neutral, not necessarily plausi-
ble.'4 The prosecutor in Purkett peremptorily excused two black
men from the panel, offering the following as the race-neutral
reason: "I don't like the way they looked, with the way the hair is
cut, both of them. And the mustaches and beards look suspicious
to me."'45 The Court held that the proffered reason was suffi-
ciently race-neutral to satisfy step two of Batson, and that any
consideration of the plausibility of that reason must await step
three.46
Purkett arose in the context of a habeas corpus proceeding in
which the Court may have felt compelled to give a special level of
deference to the state trial court's findings. 4 ' Moreover, the ac-
tual impact of the decision is likely to be modest: a facially race-
neutral but totally implausible reason will get the challenger
past the second Batson step, but likely not past the third. Never-
theless, Purkett illustrates the inherent problem of identifying
exactly what constitutes a "facially race-neutral" explanation. As
the dissent notes, at some point a sufficiently narrowed "race-
neutral" explanation can, in fact, be a cover for race discrimina-
' Professor Alschuler has made this point forcefully:
Imagine a statute that generalized the principle underlying any specific use of a per-
emptory challenge to exclude a prospective juror who could not be disqualified for
cause. This statute might disqualify from jury service both people who smile at de-
fense attorneys and people who smile at prosecutors, or it might disqualify from a
jury anyone with a child the same age as the defendant and anyone with a child the
same age as the complaining witness. Although the line drawn by this statute might
be less offensive than many of the lines that lawyers draw in exercising peremptory
challenges, it probably could not survive constitutional scrutiny.... The peremptory
challenge is no better and may often be worse.
Alschuler, 56 U Chi L Rev at 204 (cited in note 1).
'"115 S Ct 1769, 1771 (1995).
'MId at 1770.
'"Id at 1771.
"Justice Stevens's dissent notes another procedural nuance: the only "factual find-
ing" that the state trial judge made was that the defendant failed to meet Batson step
one; that is, he failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination. There were no
findings as to Batson step two (whether the prosecution offered a race-neutral reason) or
step three (whether the defendant met his burden of proving the juror was excused be-
cause of his or her race, and not because of the race-neutral reason). Id at 1772 (Stevens
dissenting).
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tion."' How exactly is a trial judge to decide whether a prosecu-
tor's exclusion of the only black men in a venire is or is not race-
based, when the proffered neutral explanation is that they have
facial hair, and they are the only ones in the entire venire with
facial hair? What if the proffered reason is something more
closely associated with race, such as having curly hair? By dis-
pensing with any plausibility requirement at step two of the Bat-
son inquiry, the Purkett Court may be making it marginally more
difficult for trial courts at step three to separate out nonsensical
reasons that are truly race-neutral from nonsensical reasons that
may indeed be pretextual.
C. Extending Batson: Other Suspect Classifications
An even more serious threat to the continuing vitality of
Batson may come from the question of whether it should be ex-
tended beyond race and sex to include religion and national ori-
gin-two classifications traditionally deemed "suspect" under the
Equal Protection Clause.
To date, the question of expanding Batson to national origin
does not seem to have arisen in ways separate from the question
of race."' Thus, Hispanics are treated as a race for Batson pur-
poses, without distinguishing, for example, between Mexican-
Americans and Argentinean-Americans. 50 Although logic seems
to compel the conclusion that Batson must apply to peremptory
challenges based on national origin, it is equally clear that such
an extension would unleash an unseemly and uncontrollable pa-
rade of horribles, which perhaps explains why most courts have
chosen to hide the national origin issue in the more familiar
" Indeed, Justice Stevens suggests that an explanation such as "I don't like his beard"
is not constitutionally different from the explanation "I don't like his looks," and that
without more such an explanation might be pretextual as a matter of law. Id at 1774. See
David A. Sutphen, Note, True Lies: The Role of Pretext Evidence under Batson v. Ken-
tucky in the Wake of St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 94 Mich L Rev 488, 497-503 (1995)
(explaining Batson's standard of proof for discrimination); Richard C. Reuben, Excuses,
Excuses, 82 ABA J 20 (Feb 1996) (noting that Purkett makes proving racial or gender dis-
crimination more difficult); Joan E. Imbriani, Note, Prosecutor's Explanation For Exercise
of Peremptory Challenges Need Only Be Race-Neutral, Not Persuasive or Plausible, When
Intentional Racial Discrimination is Alleged-Purkett v. Elem, 115 S Ct 1769 (1995) (per
curiam), 6 Seton Hall Const L J 911 (1996) (same). See also the discussion of when lan-
guage may in fact be a pretext for race or ethnic discrimination at notes 153-55 and ac-
companying text.
.. Chief Justice Rehnquist has observed, in a context other than peremptory chal-
lenges, that classifications based on national origin are "the first cousins of race." Trimble
v Gordon, 430 US 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist dissenting).
'"'For a fascinating discussion of the historical and cultural oversimplification inher-
ent in the term "Hispanic," see Alen v State, 596 S2d 1083, 1091-96 (Fla Dist Ct App
1992) (Gersten specially concurring).
1997]
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wrappings of race or even ethnicity. As Professor Alschuler noted
in a pre-Powers context:
[I]n light of the historic enmity between China and Japan
and their lack of a common language, a Japanese-American
defendant [arguably] could not challenge the discriminatory
exclusion of prospective Chinese-American jurors. One
cringes at the prospect of turning constitutional rights on
the invidious, irrelevant inquiries that Batson seems to con-
template. 5'
Judges will not only need to be amateur anthropologists,'52 but
amateur historians and linguists as well.
Although the Court has to date avoided the issue of national
origin, it has stepped onto the similarly slippery slope of lan-
guage, which of course is often a component of both national ori-
gin and ethnicity. In Hernandez v New York, a plurality of the
Court held that when a defendant made out a prima facie case
that the prosecution had excluded bilingual Hispanic prospective
jurors, the fact that those bilingual jurors had expressed some
hesitancy about relying only on in-court English translations and
not on the underlying in-court Spanish testimony was an appro-
priately neutral explanation. 5 ' The Court held that a race-
neutral reason was not discriminatory simply because it argua-
bly would have an ethnically disproportionate impact.'54
This issue is a terribly difficult one, because language is of-
ten an important component of ethnicity and national origin. As
the plurality itself recognized, to excuse prospective jurors be-
cause of their proficiency in their native tongue rather than be-
cause their English is inadequate, is troubling at best; at worst,
it may be constitutionally indistinguishable from excluding them
because of their ethnicity or national origin.'55
"
5Alschuler, 56 U Chi L Rev at 192 n 150 (cited in note 1).
52 See text accompanying notes 220-21.
500 US 352, 356-70 (1991).
...Id at 359-70.
'"Our decision today does not imply that exclusion of bilinguals from jury service is
wise, or even that it is constitutional in all cases. It is a harsh paradox that one may
become proficient enough in English to participate in trial, only to encounter dis-
qualification because he knows a second language as well.
Id at 371 (citation omitted). One could argue that Hernandez does not in fact take us all
the way down this troublesome road, because it is grounded on the specific and articu-
lated reluctance of the bilingual jurors in that case to disregard the in-court Spanish. Pro-
fessor Marder takes this limited view. Marder, 73 Tex L Rev at 1115 n 308 (cited in note
2). See also Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of Peremp-
tory Challenges, 35 Wm & Mary L Rev 21 (1993). See generally Cheryl A. O'Brien, Note,
Hernandez v. New York- Did the Supreme Court Intend to Overrule Batson's Standard of
"Racially Neutral'?, 15 W New Eng L Rev 315 (1993).
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Most problematic of all, however, is the question of whether
Batson should be extended to religion. Though not yet addressed
by the Supreme Court, this issue has been the subject of consid-
erable caselaw and even more commentary. 58 Although there is
probably no principled way to resist the extension of Batson to
religion, state and federal courts have quite regularly been will-
ing to do so.'57 The problem, of course, is that a religious belief is
just one of many personal beliefs people hold, and which they are
permitted to hold and then to express under the First Amend-
ment. If a particular religious belief triggers Batson protection,
so perhaps does a particular philosophical or political belief.'
May a prosecutor constitutionally excuse all socialists from a jury
panel? May a public defender constitutionally excuse all neo-
Nazis?
Professor Bader has taken these arguments to their logical
extreme, arguing that Batson should generally be extended to
"See the cases cited in note 157. As for commentary, see generally, Melissa Roth
Triedman, Comment, Extending Batson v. Kentucky to Religion-Based Peremptory Chal-
lenges, 4 S Cal Interdisciplinary L J 99 (1994); J. Suzanne Bell Chambers, Note, Applying
the Break: Religion and the Peremptory Challenge, 70 Ind L J 569 (1995); Furst, Note, Re-
ligious Freedom Restoration Act, 30 Valp U L Rev 761 (cited in note 1); Benjamin Hoorn
Barton, Note, Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges After Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B.
v. Alabama: An Equal Protection and First Amendment Analysis, 94 Mich L Rev 191
(1995); Mason, Note, 29 Ga L Rev 493 (cited in note 1).
... See, for example, United States v Clemmons, 892 F2d 1153, 1158 n 6 (3d Cir 1989)
(suggesting Batson does not prohibit the exercise of peremptory challenges on the basis of
religion); State v Malone, 570 NE2d 584, 589-90 (Mll App Ct 1991) (holding that a prosecu-
tor may peremptorily excuse jurors who express strong religious convictions); State v
Davis, 504 NW2d 767, 769-71 (Minn 1993) (holding Batson does not apply to religion). But
see People v Fudge, 7 Cal 4th 1075, 31 Cal Rptr 2d 321, 332-33 (1994) (in bank) (exercise
of peremptory challenges based on ethnic, racial, or religious or similar grounds violates
Art I, § 16, of California Constitution); State v Gilmore, 103 NJ 508, 511 A2d 1150, 1157-
61 (1986) (applying equal protection analysis to peremptory challenges on basis of race,
sex, national origin, religion, or color under the New Jersey Constitution); Casarez v
State, 913 SW2d 468, 475-79 (Tex Crim App 1994) (jurors may not be peremptorily ex-
cused because of their religion). See also Joseph v State, 636 S2d 777, 779-81 (Fla Dist Ct
App 1994) (treating Jews as an ethnic group entitled to Batson protection).
" I am not unaware that in the establishment and free exercise arenas the Court has
been called upon to define "religion," and therefore to exclude nonreligious behaviors from
the protection of those clauses. See, for example, Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US 602 (1971)
(finding statutory grants of state aid to church-related schools to violate First and Four-
teenth Amendments). But if one part of the First Amendment (the free exercise and es-
tablishment clauses) is interpreted as a limitation on the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges, it is difficult to understand on what principled basis other parts of the First
Amendment (the speech and association clauses) should also not be interpreted to limit
peremptory challenges. See, for example, Casarez, 913 SW2d at 491 (Meyers dissenting):
The treatment of religious creed as an inappropriate basis for peremptory exclusion
cannot rationally be distinguished from a similar treatment of persons on account of
their Libertarian politics, their advocacy of communal living, or their membership in
the Flat Earth Society.
The University of Chicago Law Review
prohibit discrimination based on a juror's protected speech and
associations.'59 In her own example, she suggests that Batson
should prohibit a defense lawyer from peremptorily challenging
members of Mothers Against Drunk Driving, even assuming the
defense lawyer could demonstrate that members of MADD have
a greater-than-average tendency to convict. 6 ' What if the case
were a DUI case? Presumably, prosecutors would also be barred
from peremptorily excusing members of Drunk Drivers R Us. But
why stop at associational rights? Does not a juror have a First
Amendment right to publish "The Evils of Drunk Driving" or
"Drunk Driving-Not So Bad After All," and do not the authors
of those expressions of protected speech have a right not to have
their constitutionally-grounded right to serve on a jury denied to
them because of their speech? But why stop there? Are not all of
a prospective juror's responses in voir dire protected in some
fashion by the First Amendment, so that nothing a juror says in
voir dire, short of establishing a challenge for cause, could be
used to "interfere" with that juror's right to sit on the jury?
The peremptory challenge has been remarkably resilient in
the face of the many assaults on its "peremptoriness" inflicted by
Batson and the cases after Batson, but even its hardy constitu-
tion could not survive if these views about how the First
Amendment meshes with the jury trial become law. Once a pro-
spective juror's general beliefs are declared out of bounds for per-
emptories, only the tiniest informational platforms will be left
from which counsel will be able to take their insupportable and
illogical leaps into folk wisdom. Extending Batson to religion and
then to protected speech and association would surely be the
long-predicted death knell of the peremptory challenge. 6'
"
9 Bader, 24 Hofstra L Rev at 567, 593-618 (cited in note 2) (discussing rationale be-
hind expanding Batson).
..Id at 600.
... Beyond the question of whether Batson applies to all traditionally suspect classifi-
cations, lies the treacherous question of whether it applies to the myriad of quasi-suspect
classifications created by some of the Court's fluid equal protection cases, and perhaps
also suggested by protective legislation. Of course, the Court has already entered these
waters in J.E.B., by extending Batson to the quasi-suspect classification of gender. But
what about other recognized or arguably quasi-suspect classifications, like illegitimacy,
sexual preference, age, or physical disability? The answers are far from clear. rve found
no cases discussing Batson in the context of legitimacy or sexual preference. The few
courts that have addressed the question of age have held that age is not an impermissible
basis upon which to exercise peremptory challenges. See, for example, United States v
Cresta, 825 F2d 538, 544-45 (1st Cir 1987). Although there are no reported decisions ex-
tending Batson to prospective jurors with disabilities, at least one commentator has ar-
gued for such an extension. See generally, Mary A. Lynch, The Application Of Equal Pro-
tection To Prospective Jurors With Disabilities: Will Batson Cover Disability-Based
Strikes?, 57 Albany L Rev 289 (1993). Of course, once Batson let the group genie out of
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D. Peremptory Challenges and "Harmless Error"
Finally, and quite apart from the relentless stretching of the
Batson doctrine described above, there is yet another stark
symptom of the mixed institutional feelings we have about per-
emptory challenges: a trial court's erroneous impairment of a
party's exercise of peremptory challenges can in some circum-
stances be harmless.
This issue normally arises when a trial court erroneously
denies a party's challenge for cause to a prospective juror, thus
forcing that party to use up one of its peremptory challenges on
that prospective juror. In Ross v Oklahoma, a state trial court er-
roneously denied a capital defendant's challenge for cause to a
juror made during the process of "death qualifying" the jury.16 2
the bottle, there really is no logical end to the groups-real and imagined-that will line
up for its "protections."
Even if Batson is confined ultimately to race, ethnicity, and sex, the lower courts re-
main in turmoil over the precise way in which it applies to those kinds of group distinc-
tions. The fundamental disagreement appears to be whether Batson forbids any discrimi-
nation based on those immutable characteristics, or only non-benign discrimination. One
might have thought that after Powers and McCollum the answer to this question is obvi-
ous, and that all such discrimination is forbidden. See text accompanying notes 138-43.
But applying Batson to ethnic discrimination, as opposed to racial discrimination, re-
mains an analytical problem for many lower courts. Several have held that ethnic groups
that may not be considered traditionally "disadvantaged" are not Batson-cognizable. See,
for example, Murchu v United States, 926 F2d 50, 54-55 (1st Cir 1991) (Irish-Americans
not covered by Batson); United States v Bucci, 839 F2d 825, 832-34 (1st Cir 1988) (Italian-
Americans not covered by Batson without historical showing of discrimination); United
States v Di Pasquale, 864 F2d 271, 275-77 (3d Cir 1988) (same). But see United States v
Biaggi, 673 F Supp 96, 99-103 (E D NY 1987) (holding that Italian-Americans are covered
by Batson). So now add political science and ethnic studies to the disciplines that trial
judges must master in order to be able to rule on Batson challenges. See text accompa-
nying notes 148-52 and 220-21.
" 487 US 81 (1988). To "death qualify a jury means, in its broadest sense, to ask pro-
spective jurors during voir dire about their views on the death penalty, and, more specifi-
cally, to assure that those views will not interfere with a juror's ability to be fair and im-
partial. Thus, a prospective juror who expresses such strong opposition to the death pen-
alty that he or she would automatically vote for an acquittal or for non-imposition of
death may be challenged for cause, but mere opposition unconnected to an inability to
apply the law to the facts is insufficient. Lockhart v McCree, 476 US 162 (1986); Wain-
wright v Witt, 469 US 412 (1985); Witherspoon v Illinois, 391 US 510 (1968). Similarly, a
prospective juror with strong pro-death penalty views may not be challenged for cause
simply because of those views, unless he or she would automatically vote to convict or to
impose death regardless of the law and the facts. Morgan v Illinois, 504 US 719 (1992).
For a good discussion of the problem of death qualifying jurors, see James M. Carr, Note,
At Witt's End: The Continuing Quandary of Jury Selection in Capital Cases, 39 Stan L
Rev 427 (1987).
In Ross, the juror in question indicated during voir dire that he would automatically
vote for the death penalty if the defendant were found guilty. Based on that response, the
trial court erred when it denied the defendant's challenge of that juror for cause. Wither-
spoon, 391 US at 522-23.
For a particularly thought-provoking discussion of the way in which post-Batson per-
1997]
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Under Oklahoma law, as is the case in many states, 63 when a
party's challenge for cause is denied, that party must exercise a
peremptory challenge as to that juror (if any peremptory chal-
lenges are left) in order to preserve the cause issue for appeal,
and Mr. Ross's counsel did so. The Supreme Court nevertheless
affirmed Mr. Ross's conviction, concluding that the trial court's
error: (1) did not impair Mr. Ross's right to an impartial jury
(which is certainly correct because there was no evidence or ar-
gument that the any of the jurors who actually heard the case
were partial);"M and, much more mysteriously, (2) that the effec-
tive reduction in the number of peremptory challenges available
to Mr. Ross did not rise to the level of a denial of due process. 65
This second conclusion is mysterious in several different re-
spects.
First, its rationale seems fundamentally tautological: the
Court expressly relied on the fact that Oklahoma law required
Mr. Ross to use one of his peremptories on the unexcused juror,
and from that fact it concluded that Mr. Ross received "all [the
peremptory challenges] that Oklahoma law allowed him .... 166
Completing the syllogism, the Court then reasoned that since all
that happened to Mr. Ross is that the state in effect reduced the
number of his peremptory challenges, and since peremptory
challenges are creatures of statute that could constitutionally be
eliminated entirely, Mr. Ross suffered no injury of due process
magnitude.'67 But of course just because a state may constitu-
tionally eliminate peremptory challenges entirely does not mean
it may dole them out in a manner which itself violates due proc-
ess. If Oklahoma law provided that defendants had nine peremp-
tory challenges on even days but only eight on odd days (or that
emptory challenges mesh or don't mesh with the principles enunciated in Witherspoon,
see Brown v Rice, 693 F Supp 381, 389-94 (W D NC 1988), affd in part and revd in part,
Brown v Dixon, 891 F2d 490 (4th Cir 1989) (reversing district court's holding that prose-
cutor violated Constitution by using peremptories on jurors who had reservations about
the death penalty), also discussed in Alschuler, 56 U Chi L Rev at 204-06 (cited in note 1).
See note 204 and accompanying text.
1487 US at 86:
Any claim that the jury was not impartial, therefore, must focus not on [the juror
whom defendant was forced to excuse peremptorily], but on the jurors who ulti-
mately sat. None of those 12 jurors, however, was challenged for cause by
[defendant], and he has never suggested that any of the 12 was not impartial.
'"Id at 88-91.
.'Id at 91.
"Because peremptory challenges are a creature of statute and are not required by
the Constitution, it is for the State to determine the number of peremptory chal-
lenges allowed and to define their purpose and the manner of their exercise.
487 US at 89 (citations omitted).
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black defendants got nine and white defendants only eight), the
Ross majority might say that a defendant unfortunate enough to
be tried on an odd day (or to be white) got "all the peremptory
challenges allowed him by law." Of course that explanation does
nothing to address the underlying constitutional issue, which is
whether the manner in which these nonconstitutional rights
were distributed was itself constitutional.
It is true that Mr. Ross received all the peremptories he was
allowed, but he was erroneously forced to use one of those on a
juror who should have been excused for cause. Of what possible
due process significance is the fact that Oklahoma is one of many
jurisdictions that requires a peremptory challenge to be used
against a juror before a party may argue on appeal that the trial
court erred in denying a challenge for cause to that juror?
Whether a defendant, like Mr. Ross, is forced to use up one of his
peremptory challenges to preserve his cause argument on appeal,
or whether he is forced, in the absence of such a procedural re-
quirement, to use up one of his peremptory challenges to ensure
that the biased juror is not seated, is quite beside the point. In ei-
ther case, he must use up one of his peremptory challenges to ex-
cuse a juror who should have been excused for cause.
The second mysterious thing about Ross is that it seems con-
trary to the Court's holding in a 1987 case, Gray v Mississippi,"
which established a rule of per se reversal when a trial court errs
in granting a prosecution challenge for cause related to death-
qualifying the jury, even though the prosecution arguably had
unexercised peremptory challenges and could have used them on
the juror had the trial court denied the challenge for cause.'69 As
1481 US 648 (1987).
..Id at 659. The trial court in Gray got just about everything wrong in ruling on
challenges for cause. The prosecution was forced to exercise five or six of its twelve per-
emptory challenges to exclude jurors who expressed hesitation about the death penalty in
such a way that they should probably have been excused for cause. Id at 652-55. See the
discussion of Witherspoon at note 162. After the state had exhausted all of its peremptory
challenges, a replacement prospective juror stated that although she was opposed to the
death penalty, she could impose it in an appropriate case. Gray, 481 US at 653. Under
Witherspoon and its progeny, that juror should not have been excused for cause, yet the
trial court excused her for cause. Perhaps sensing that it had earlier erred when it forced
the prosecution to use up many of its peremptories on jurors who should have been ex-
cused for cause, the trial court hinted that additional prosecutorial peremptories might be
in order, but never awarded any, because instead it erroneously excused the juror for
cause. Gray, 481 US at 654-55. Of course, the juror who eventually replaced that juror
voted, along with all the other seated jurors, for conviction and for the death penalty. Id
at 656. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's error in removing the juror for
cause was not harmless, and indeed required per se reversal. Id at 667-68. See also Davis
v Georgia, 429 US 122, 123 (1976) (Witherspoon error not harmless just because other
anti-death penalty jurors were not excluded). For a discussion of Batson harmless error,
1997]
The University of Chicago Law Review
the dissent in Ross points out, the majority's attempt to distin-
guish Gray amounts to nothing more than an unarticulated un-
willingness to "extend" Gray beyond its narrow facts." It is hard
to understand how the error in Gray triggered per se reversal,
despite the fact that that error could have been wiped clean by a
prosecution peremptory, while the peremptory challenge which
Mr. Ross was erroneously forced to exercise was deemed harm-
less. If anything, Ross involved a substantially more direct intru-
sion into a defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges than
did Gray.
Finally, it may be very difficult for the Ross majority to limit
its holding to the facts in that case, particularly now that Powers
v Ohio' and Georgia v McCollum' have shifted the constitu-
tional focus from litigants' rights to prospective jurors' rights.
How can an erroneous Batson ruling ever be anything but harm-
less if we are indeed talking about the rights of prospective ju-
rors and not about the rights of litigants?
In any event, the very fact that Ross recognizes that in some
circumstances a trial court's erroneous interference in a party's
exercise of peremptory challenges may be harmless, speaks vol-
umes about the ambivalence the Court continues to feel about
the role of the peremptory challenge.
III. NOT ONLY IS THE CURE OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
WORSE THAN THE DISEASE, IT IS THE DISEASE
Many critics of the peremptory challenge have described it
as a tool whose original purposes were legitimate, but which over
and its relationship to the idea that a party must "preserve" arguments that a challenge
for cause should have been granted by striking that juror peremptorily, see note 204.
1701 believe that [the majority's] conclusion is irreconcilable with this Court's holding
just last Term that a similar Sixth Amendment error in capital jury selection re-
quires resentencing if -the composition of the jury panel as a whole could possibly
have been affected by the trial court's error.'"... The Court's attempt to distinguish
Gray not only fails to persuade, but also fails to protect petitioner's Sixth Amend-
ment right to an impartial jury by condoning a scheme that penalizes the assertion
of that right. I am convinced that application of Gray's per se resentencing rule in
this case is the only course consistent with the Sixth Amendment.
The Court today unaccountably refuses to apply [the Gray] per se rule in a case in-
volving a similar Sixth Amendment error. Here the trial court, rather than excusing
a qualified juror, refused to excuse a biased juror. The defense's attempt to correct
the court's error and preserve its Sixth Amendment claim deprived it of a peremp-
tory challenge.... Even the Court acknowledges that the defense's loss of a peremp-
tory challenge meets the Gray test.
487 US at 92-93 (Marshall dissenting) (citations omitted).
"'499 US 400 (1991). See text accompanying notes 138, 142-43.
"'505 US 42 (1992). See text accompanying notes 140, 141-43.
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time has either outlived its usefulness or has been used for ifile-
gitimate purposes. 17'3 These critics praise by faint condemnation.
Although the American strain of the peremptory challenge-with
its racist traditions 4 and post-Batson Orwellianism 75 may well
have been turned away from its original English purposes, it
doesn't necessarily follow that those original purposes were
automatically legitimate by virtue of tradition and history. In-
deed, a case can be made that the peremptory challenge has
never had any legitimate purpose.
The historical distinction we must keep in mind is between
prosecutorial peremptories and defense peremptories. The first
English peremptories were the Crown's unlimited peremptories
in capital cases; the defendant's thirty-five peremptories were
merely granted to counter the Crown's power. 7  What disease
were the Crown's unlimited number of peremptory challenges
originally designed to cure?
The royal answer in England was not-as it was in the
American South five centuries later-that the peremptory chal-
lenge was to serve as a second line of defense to the democratiza-
tion of the venire.' Rather, the purpose of the peremptory chal-
lenge was more basic: to eliminate jurors for cause. In reality, the
Crown's unlimited number of peremptory challenges began as
challenges for cause coupled with the principle of royal infallibil-
ity. If the King's prosecutors asserted that a prospective juror
should not sit, then that juror was presumed to have some con-
nection with the case sufficient to require his removal for cause,
and no further inquiry was needed.' 8
"See, for example, Gurney, Note, 21 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 244-56 (cited in note 2)
(arguing for abolition of peremptory challenges); Melilli, 71 Notre Dame L Rev at 502
(cited in note 2) (concluding that Batson has outlived its usefulness); Morehead, 43
DePaul L Rev at 632-36 (cited in note 2); Pizzi, 1987 S Ct Rev at 123-44 (cited in note 2)
(critiquing Batson).
"See text accompanying notes 95-111.
" See text accompanying notes 142-72, and notes 221-23.
'""See text accompanying notes 47-50.
"Indeed, although the early English venire was by no means comparable in its diver-
sity to the modern American version, see note 95, as early as the eighteenth century it
was "a reasonably democratic institution," at least by standards of that time. Alschuler,
56 U Chi L Rev at 165 n 49 (cited in note 1). It excluded all women, all men over seventy,
peers and certain occupations, including some doctors, soldiers and clerics. Id. Yet it was
easier to qualify to sit on an eighteenth-century English jury than it was to qualify for the
House of Commons or even to hunt game. Id.
.Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures at 148 (cited in note 51): "[Ihe English judges
have assumed that cause existed whenever the Crown wants to challenge a juror." The
King's prosecutors reportedly exercised their so-called "peremptory" challenges by stating
"quod non boni sunt pro rege," or "because they are not good for the King." Proffatt, Trial
by Jury § 159 (cited in note 14).
1997] 845
The University of Chicago Law Review
Thus, the royal peremptory challenge was not really a per-
emptory challenge at all, and it did not really become peremptory
until it was given in its non-royal form to defendants.'79 This of
course also explains the otherwise inexplicable fact that the
Crown had an unlimited number of peremptory challenges. Actu-
ally, both the Crown and the defendant had an unlimited number
of challenges for cause; the Crown simply had no obligation to ar-
ticulate the cause.
By 1305, when all facets of royal infallibility were coming
under attack, Parliament attempted to no avail to eradicate en-
tirely the notion that the King's prosecutors were infallible in
their detection of disqualified jurors.180 Parliament's choice of
language is instructive:
That from henceforth, notwithstanding it be alleged by them
that sue for the King, that the Jurors of those Inquests, or
some of them, be not indifferent for the King, yet such In-
quests shall not remain untaken; but if they that sue for the
King will challenge any of those jurors, they shall assign of
their Challenge a Cause Certain and the truth of the same
Challenge shall be enquired of according to the custom of the
court... .81
This language gives further credence to the idea that the cause
was always present, but simply undisclosed. It corroborates the
idea that the King's unlimited peremptories were actually unar-
ticulated challenges for cause.
When Parliament failed in its efforts to kill this remnant of
royal infallibility, the defective gene was inherited by defendants,
and then passed on to American prosecutors and defense law-
yers. There is no small amount of irony in the fact that modern
lawyers' deeply held belief in their ability to ferret out hidden ju-
ror bias may well have as its historical and structural antecedent
the now decidedly out-of-fashion notion that the King can do no
wrong.
The fact that the peremptory challenge sprang to life as a
corollary to the axiom of royal infallibility is terribly important,
not only to understand why it was abolished in England and why
its abolition in America is long overdue, but also to understand
those nagging institutional doubts about peremptory challenges
with which we as judges, jurors, lawyers, litigants, and citizens
seem to have struggled for the last five hundred years. The ideas
" See text accompanying notes 47-50.
"See text accompanying note 59.
"'.33 Edw 1 (1305) (Eng) (emphasis added).
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that the peremptory challenge is decidedly undemocratic, that it
is susceptible to significant abuse by authorities, and that it is
inherently irrational, all flow directly from the fact that the per-
emptory challenge is actually the lost heir of the divine right of
kings. Something is fundamentally wrong with a jury selection
system in which a lawyer can excuse perfectly qualified and ob-
jectively impartial jurors without offering any explanation. The
something that is fundamentally wrong is that lawyers are no
more infallible than kings.
Even ignoring its origins in the doctrine of royal infallibility,
there is a second fundamental way in which the peremptory
challenge is historically incongruous with our modern notions of
the jury: peremptory challenges were invented two hundred
years before the idea of impartiality ever applied to jurors. Eng-
lish jurors in the middle of the thirteenth century, when peremp-
tory challenges first appeared, were still witnesses, selected pre-
cisely for their lack of independence.182 It would be another two
hundred years before their role as impartial fact-finders would be
fully crystallized.8 3 By that time, the English peremptory chal-
lenge was already an old remnant of the struggle between King
and Parliament, and that struggle had nothing to do with juror
impartiality.
Indeed, once jurors stopped being witnesses, and impartial-
ity became the pole star of the English jury, the struggle between
King and Parliament began to lose meaning in the context of the
jury: jurors now served the role of impartial, independent fact-
finders, rather than witness-proxies for King or lord. It is hardly
surprising, given this history, that the round hole of the peremp-
tory challenge has never quite fit into the square peg of juror im-
partiality.
When we cogitate today about what exactly the peremptory
challenge has to do with jury impartiality, we should not be
ashamed to say "nothing." That was true for at least two hundred
years, and I suspect it has always been true. Jury impartiality is
grounded on two complementary institutional commitments: the
commitment to include broad segments of the population as pro-
spective jurors, and the commitment to exclude from those broad
segments individual jurors who simply cannot be fair in a par-
ticular case. The peremptory challenge has nothing whatever to
do with the commitment to a broad cross-section, and in fact it
2 See text accompanying notes 22-25.
" See note 25 and accompanying text.
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threatens to render that commitment hollow.' Nor does it have
much to do with the task of rationally and honestly separating
partial jurors from impartial jurors."5 It is a true historical rem-
nant; not only a quaint vestigial tail on the royal prerogative, but
perhaps also a dangerous appendix waiting to burst in the gut of
the Sixth Amendment.
IV. THE EXTRAORDINARY CONDITIONS THAT GAVE RISE TO THE
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE, AND SUPPORTED ITS CONTINUATION,
Do NOT EXIST TODAY
If anything is clear about the history of the English peremp-
tory challenge, it is that a criminal defendant's right to peremp-
tory challenges was a relatively moderate response to two ex-
traordinary and, from Parliament's point of view, intolerable
conditions: the Crown handpicked all prospective jurors, and the
Crown theoretically exercised an unlimited number of peremp-
tory challenges. Given these two conditions, thirty-five defense
peremptories seemed a measured response to the Crown's loaded
deck. Even after Parliament abolished all prosecutorial peremp-
tories in 1305, the Crown retained its power to select prospective
jurors, and this power in and of itself likely justified continuation
of the defendant's common law right to thirty-five peremptories.
It probably came as no surprise to the more cynical members of
Parliament that before the ink was dry on its abolition of all
prosecutorial peremptories, the King's courts entirely circum-
vented that abolition by adopting the procedure of standing
aside.
It is also no surprise that as the English jury became more
and more diverse, and the Crown's role in handpicking jurors be-
came less and less direct, the need for peremptories declined. It
appears that the peremptory challenge withered and eventually
died in England for the same reason most institutions do: it sim-
ply no longer served any function. In the beginning, it may have
been an important tool for the protection of the individual defen-
dant against the excesses of the Crown. But as Parliament
steadily reduced the power of the Crown, so too was the potential
for jury abuse reduced. As the qualifications for English jury
duty became more and more open, there simply was no need, and
no temptation, for any protections above and beyond the chal-
lenge for cause.'86
'
8 See text accompanying notes 230-35.
See text accompanying notes 212-29.
'It is curious how increased diversification of the venire was seen by the English as
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The American experience was quite different. The barriers to
jury service in the United States were not gradually and peace-
fully lowered over a period of centuries; they were torn down
rapidly in the violence of civil war. Southern states resisted at
every turn, and when faced with the inevitability of desegregated
venires, they turned to the peremptory challenge as the primary
tool to keep blacks off juries.
In very much the same way that the peremptory challenge in
England was used by Parliament as a device to restrict the power
of the King, the peremptory challenge in the United States was
used by states to restrict the desegregating power of the federal
government. So one way to look at the differences between the
English experience and the American experience is to consider
America's civil rights struggle as effecting a kind of remission in
the natural degeneration of the peremptory challenge.
To be sure, the peremptory challenge enjoyed a more favor-
able place in the history of the United States, even apart from
the states' resistance to civil rights. All indications are that
throughout our history, even in colonial times, and in the North
as well as the South, whenever peremptory challenges were
available American lawyers exercised them, and did so in num-
bers and frequency far exceeding the English custom. It is not
entirely clear why the American strain of the peremptory chal-
lenge has been so robust, especially in the face of the now dis-
credited racial history in which it played so significant a part.
The most cynical among us might say that the peremptory chal-
lenge today serves precisely the same racist and sexist functions
it has served throughout our history, and that it is being used the
same old way it has always been used, save for some nominal
and meaningless extra hoops now required by Batson. Indeed,
there is some evidence to support this suggestion.'87 The most
naive among us might suggest that Batson has eradicated the
racist and sexist aspects of the peremptory challenge, and that
peremptory challenges now effectively serve the function they
were designed to serve before they were hijacked by the forces of
a reason to dispense with peremptory challenges, while in America even the constitution-
ally grounded command of a fair cross-section has not driven the peremptory challenge
away.
" TIt appears that prosecutors in southern and border states continue to use peremp-
tory challenges at a rate significantly higher than most of their northern colleagues. See
note 192. There is also evidence to suggest that the peremptory challenge is used at a
high rate in some northern cities with large black populations. See, for example, People v
Frazier, 127 Ill App 3d 151, 469 NE2d 594, 598-99 (1984), which, though pre-Batson,
summarizes the shameful extent to which Chicago-area prosecutors used peremptory
challenges to exclude minorities from juries.
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American segregation, though this explanation does not account
for their withering away in England.
This American love affair with the peremptory challenge
probably has many non-civil rights explanations: our founders'
generalized distrust of governmental power, perhaps best repre-
sented by our federal system, in which the states themselves are
a structural expression of that distrust; an overestimation of the
historical significance of the English peremptory challenge; a
freer and potentially more infecting press;8 ' a legal tradition
more permissive of lawyers' excesses; and a more wooden adher-
ence to principles of adversariness.189 All of these conditions
probably played some role in forming a cultural agar in which the
American peremptory challenge was able to flourish.
But there can be no doubt that the single most significant
factor in extending the life of the peremptory challenge in the
United States was its use as a tool to perpetuate the racial purity
of juries. Now that that battle has been lost by the states, it is
time to retire the peremptory challenge.
Today, constitutional and statutory guarantees are firmly in
place, insuring not only open-ended, virtually unrestricted, juror
qualification, 90 but also race-neutral summoning mechanisms
producing venires representing reasonably fair cross-sections of
"Because English courts have traditionally exercised more control over the press
than American courts, some commentators believe the peremptory challenge in America
assumed a more significant role in eliminating jurors whose hidden biases were the re-
sult of pretrial publicity. See, for example, Bray, Comment, 40 UCLA L Rev at 522 n 22
(cited in note 1), citing Pendleton Howard, Criminal Justice in England. A Study in Law
Administration 362-64 (MacMllan 1931).
" See text accompanying notes 223-40.
'Under the Federal Jury Selection Act of 1968, the only statutory disqualifications
from federal jury service are if the prospective juror:
(1) is not a citizen of the United States eighteen years old who has resided for a pe-
riod of one year within the judicial district;
(2) is unable to read, write, and understand the English language with a degree of
proficiency sufficient to fill out satisfactorily the juror qualification form;
(3) is unable to speak the English language;
(4) is incapable, by reason of mental or physical infirmity, to render satisfactory jury
service; or
(5) has a charge pending against him for the commission of, or has been convicted in
a State or Federal court of record of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for more
than one year and his civil rights have not been restored.
28 USC § 1865 (1994). Most states have equally modest statutory requirements for jury
service. See, for example, the Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act § 8, in 13 Uniform
Laws Annotated 453 (1986) (adopted entirely or substantially in Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho,
Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi and North Dakota). Id at 437.
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communities. 9' I am not so naive to suggest that racism, sexism,
classism, ageism, homophobia, or a host of other human preju-
dices have been, or can ever be, eradicated from the jury selection
procedure-either in assembling the venires or in selecting trial
jurors from those venires-any more than they can be eradicated
from the human condition.'92 However, the institutional struc-
tures that permitted (and indeed encouraged) race, ethnic, and
sex discrimination in the selection of venires and juries have
been dismantled. Conditions today are so markedly different
than they were in England in 1305, or even in Alabama in 1965,
that both the most ponderously inert and the most deeply cynical
among us must ask whether the peremptory challenge has any
continuing utility, if it ever had any, as a mechanism to insure
the impartiality of juries.
Even if one clings, as do some public defenders with whom I
have discussed this question, to the notion that American venires
"Under the Federal Jury Selection Act of 1968, federal venires are drawn either
from voter registration lists or lists of actual voters, at the option of each district or divi-
sion. 28 USC § 1863(b)(2) (1994). In addition, each district must supplement those lists
with other sources "where necessary to foster the policy and protect the rights secured"
by the Act. Id. Most states have similar juror-summoning mechanisms. See, for example,
the Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act § 5, in 13 Uniform Laws Annotated 445
(1986), which gives local jury commissioners the same option of voter registration lists or
actual voter lists, and which also contains a laundry list of suggested additional sources:
utility customers, tax rolls, motor vehicle registrations, and driver's license lists. Even
these broad federal and state juror sources arguably underrepresent some groups of pro-
spective jurors, including some racial and ethnic minorities, and perhaps also young peo-
ple of all races and ethnic groups. See note 192. Nevertheless, I suspect that the gates of
today's venire are as wide open as they have ever been in the history of the jury trial.
"My own experience as a trial judge in a large western city is that the people sum-
moned for jury duty are reasonably reflective of the general population, with perhaps only
some marginal underrepresentation of blacks, Hispanics and young people owing to the
nature of our sources for jury lists (voter registration supplemented by motor vehicle
registration). Yet it is also my sense, unsupported by any kind of formal or informal
study, that the venires we actually see in court are more than marginally underrepresen-
tative of blacks, Hispanics, young people, and men. We have a shockingly high 50 to 60
percent failure-to-appear rate on jury summonses, and my untested observation for the
difference between the make-up of the people summoned and the make-up of the people
on the venires is that blacks, Hispanics, young people, and men may be somewhat more
likely to disregard their summonses than their race, ethnic, age, and gender counter-
parts.
I am also well aware that my judicial experience is in a region without an explicit
segregationist tradition, and that that tradition seems still quite important in terms of
the use and abuse of the peremptory challenge. It is disturbing, though not entirely sur-
prising, that over the seven-year period from 1986 to 1993, the number of reported cases
in which Batson challenges have been litigated are highest (not only on a per capita basis
but in some instances even in raw numbers) in the southern and border states. Melilli, 71
Notre Dame L Rev at 466-70 (cited in note 2). Texas boasts a nation-leading 96 reported
Batson cases in this period; significantly smaller Alabama reported an astounding 92;
Missouri 58; Georgia 51; Louisiana 49. By contrast, there were only 47 reported Batson
cases in all of New York state in this same period; 24 in California. Id at 467.
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are rampant not only with seething anti-defendant bigotry but
with the kind of seething anti-defendant bigotry that is smart
enough to disguise itself from the glare of the challenge for cause,
the practice of giving equal numbers of peremptory challenges to
each side actually increases, not decreases, the chances that
these smart bigots will end up on the jury. This is so because any
given peremptory challenge is more valuable to the prosecution
in ferreting out those hypothetically few pro-defense jurors than
it is to the defense, who will use up all its challenges and still
tend to be left with some of those hypothetically rampant pro-
prosecution jurors.9 ' Perhaps this is why, in an informal survey
of the lawyers who practice in my courtroom, the prosecutors
seemed substantially more vigorous in their defense of the per-
emptory challenge than the defense lawyers.' Perhaps this is
'For example, let us assume a venire of one hundred made up of eighty pro-
prosecution people and twenty pro-defense people. If we assume a "strike" system, see
note 205, and that a panel of twenty-five is selected to be tested for cause and then sub-
jected to peremptory challenges, the panel will on the average consist of twenty pro-
prosecution people and only five pro-defense people. The prosecution will theoretically be
able to exercise peremptory challenges to eliminate all pro-defense people from the jury.
Of course, substituting "white" for "pro-prosecution" and "black" for "pro-defense," is pre-
cisely how the peremptory challenge was used for two hundred years in the American
South to eliminate all blacks from juries. See text accompanying notes 96-111.
There is a nuance this hypothetical ignores, and that others have called in a more
general context the principle of asymmetry: because a hung jury is ordinarily considered
a victory for the defense, one pro-defense juror has significantly more value to the defense
(and is correspondingly more dangerous to the prosecution) than a pro-prosecution juror
has to the prosecution. The prosecutor needs to exclude all pro-defense jurors before he or
she can obtain a victory; the defense lawyer only need sneak in one pro-defense juror to
achieve a hung jury. This asymmetry justifies to some extent a more even distribution of
peremptories than the above hypothetical suggests. Of course, this asymmetry is also just
a small part of the more general asymmetric picture in a criminal case framed by the
prosecution's burden of proof and the defendant's right to remain silent. That asymmetry
formed the basis of some commentators' pre-McCollum arguments that Batson should not
be extended to defense peremptories. See, for example, Goldwasser, 102 Harv L Rev at
811-20 (cited in note 2).
Of course, this hypothetical also ignores the fact, discussed in the text accompanying
note 210, that it is a gross oversimplification to categorize jurors as pro-prosecution or
pro-defense.
'When I asked one of the prosecutors in my courtroom what she thought of abolish-
ing peremptory challenges, she responded, "I'd rather get rid of challenges for cause."
This comment is telling, not only because it expresses a level of commitment to the per-
emptory challenge, which I found almost universal among prosecutors, but also because it
may well have been a way of expressing how the peremptory challenge is really just a
lazy man's challenge for cause, much as it once was a lazy King's challenge for cause. See
text accompanying notes 173-78. I also found it quite interesting that of the nine prosecu-
tors whom I informally surveyed, only three expressed any sympathy at all with the idea
of abolishing peremptory challenges, and each of those three handles complex prosecu-
tions, many of which originate in the grand jury. In Colorado, the grand jury is selected
without any peremptory challenges. Two of the three prosecutors inclined toward abol-
ishing peremptory challenges based their views at least in part on their favorable experi-
ences in picking and then working with grand jurors selected without the benefit of per-
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also why, for most of the history of the peremptory challenge, in
both England and America, the defense customarily has enjoyed
substantially more peremptory challenges than the prosecu-
tion.19
5
V. THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE IS INCONSISTENT
WITH FUNDAMENTAL PRECEPTS OF AN IMPARTIAL JURY
If it were just that changing social, cultural and even consti-
tutional conditions have made peremptory challenges obsolete,
one could argue that their abolition is unnecessary. But they are
not just obsolete. Especially now, in their post-Batson mutated
form, peremptory challenges conflict with the most basic notions
of individual liberty and individual responsibility inherent in the
idea of trial by an impartial jury.
I came to this conclusion in a sort of extended epiphany
during the course of my most recent tour of duty in a criminal di-
vision. During a streak of particularly serious cases, I gave the
prospective jurors my usual introductory remarks, which include
an overview of the selection process. In front of all of these pro-
spective jurors, all of whom were rapt with the attention and se-
riousness of an impending murder or rape trial, I heard myself
explain to them what I always explain-that we will go through a
series of procedures to make sure they can be fair, we will elimi-
nate those whom I determine cannot be fair, and then, after we
are left with a panel of fair people, the lawyers get to eliminate
some of those fair people without having to say why.
When one actually must explain this process out loud, it
starts to make less and less sense, especially when one must do
so in front of a group of citizens poised to embark on the most se-
rious of civic endeavors, and who desperately want the process to
make sense. In ruminating about my discomfort, I have come to
the conclusion that there are three separate but related reasons
why the whole concept of a peremptory challenge conflicts with
basic notions of an impartial jury: (1) the peremptory challenge
reflects an inappropriate distrust of prospective jurors; (2) it im-
properly shifts the focus of jury selection from individuals to
groups; and (3) it injects an inappropriate level of adversariness
into the jury selection process.
emptory challenges.
... See text accompanying notes 59-65 and 83-91.
1997]
The University of Chicago Law Review
A. The Peremptory Challenge Reflects an Inappropriate
Distrust of Jurors
The most obvious, and in some ways most important, dimen-
sion of the problem of the peremptory challenge is that it reflects
a deep distrust of prospective jurors wholly inconsistent with the
trust we repose in sitting jurors. We call citizens to jury duty
with the stick of a summons and the carrot of high-minded ap-
peals to their civic duty, but then we pass over great numbers of
them for no reason at all. 9 ' We tell them we want fair jurors, and
that we have sophisticated mechanisms in place to separate the
fair from the unfair, but then we suggest that these mechanisms
are not only imperfect, but so imperfect that we guess that any-
where from 60 to 80 percent of them who pass muster for cause
are actually holding hidden biases that our fancy questions can-
not detect.'97 We give them an oath to tell the truth, but then
suggest we think most of them will lie. We tell them the case
must be decided based solely on the facts presented and the law
on which they are instructed, but then suggest few of them will
be able to do so.
Perhaps this mistrust is well-founded, and perhaps the ten-
sion between the challenge for cause and the peremptory chal-
lenge is just one facet of the same Hobbes/Locke ambivalence
that runs throughout the jury concept and indeed throughout the
premises upon which our democracy was founded: There is
enough good in the average person to have confidence he will
render the right verdict (or elect the right official), but enough
evil in him to suspect otherwise.
Still, even if the peremptory challenge is viewed as a kind of
check and balance to the confidence we repose in jurors, the bal-
ance seems terribly skewed. Perhaps one or two peremptories in
the odd case would, as in the English tradition, represent an
adequate safeguard against the prospective juror who is the se-
cret Klansman or the closet anarchist. But the American strain
of peremptory challenges conveys to jurors a cynical and wholly
exaggerated view of the extent to which we are teeming with
peijurers and bigots, especially considering the great confidence
we repose in jurors the moment they are seated and sworn, and
" See text accompanying notes 205-06.
"In noncapital federal cases, a total of sixteen peremptory challenges are available to
select a jury of twelve. FRCrP 24(b). Assuming a strike system, see note 205, this means
that of the twenty-eight jurors who are passed for cause and who form the pool against
which peremptories are to be exercised, we think up to sixteen (or 57 percent) may have
hidden biases. This "bias index" increases to 77 percent in capital cases, where a total of
forty peremptory challenges are available.
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the even greater, almost unassailable, confidence we repose in
their ultimate judgment.9 '
We even place significantly more trust in judges than in pro-
spective jurors. We expect judges to be impartial arbiters of the
law, and jurors to be impartial arbiters of the facts, yet who
among us would condone an institutionalized system of judge
shopping, where each side has some veto power over which judge
presides over a case?'99 Instead, we are content that as long as a
judge does not violate relatively objective standards that would
require him or her to recuse,"' the judge can continue on a case
despite any hidden biases. We should be no less trusting of our
citizen-jurors.2 '
s3Professor Alschuler has criticized the stark difference between, on the one hand,
the lack of confidence we repose in jurors at the front end of the trial during jury selec-
tion, and in the middle of the trial with paternalistic rules of evidence, and, on the other
hand, the almost unassailable confidence we repose in jury verdicts by way of the doc-
trine of judicial review. Alschuler, 56 U Chi L Rev at 211-18, 232 (cited in note 1). Al-
though I share some of Professor Alschuler's concerns, I am not so troubled by a system
whose component parts offer a set of arguably inconsistent principles designed in some
rough fashion to reflect our ambiguity about the nature of man, as I am with the single
component of the peremptory challenge, which is internally inconsistent and inappropri-
ately skewed toward distrust.
1
"This rhetorical questions turns out not to be so rhetorical. Nineteen states cur-
rently have some statute and/or rule giving litigants a one-time option to remove the as-
signed judge, without cause. For a listing of these states, and citations to the rules and
statutes, see United States v Escobar, 803 F Supp 611, 614 (E D NY 1992). Although
there were sporadic efforts in the 1970s and 1980s to extend this concept to the federal
courts-both nationwide in proposed legislation and in some circuits and districts by local
rule-those efforts all failed, after intense criticism. See generally id at 614-15; John R.
Bartels, Peremptory Challenges to Federal Judges: A Judge's View, 68 ABA J 449, 450-51
(1982) (arguing against applying peremptory challenges to judges); Edward G. Burg,
Comment, Meeting the Challenge: Rethinking Judicial Disqualification, 69 Cal L Rev
1445, 1469-80 (1981) (comparing the peremptory challenge system with existing law on
disqualification); Alan J. Chaset, Disqualification of Federal Judges by Peremptory Chal-
lenge 41 (Fed Jud Ctr 1981). In 1992, despite the absence of any federal statute or rule
authorizing peremptory challenges of federal judges, Judge Jack B. Weinstein, acting in
his capacity as Chief Judge of the Eastern District of New York, announced a rule allow-
ing all defendants in capital cases in that district to peremptorily challenge the first judge
assigned to the case. Escobar, 803 F Supp at 618. Judge Weinstein specifically reserved
the issue of whether the prosecutor in such cases should have a similar right. Id at 620.
rye found no other example of any judge-created system of peremptory challenges to
judges.
) 28 USC § 144 (1994) provides in pertinent part:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and
sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal
bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall
proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such pro-
ceeding.
"If we accepted the democratic rhetoric of the jury system, we would select juries so
that they reflected the breadth of our communities rather than the group left over
when lawyers had expended their peremptory challenges based on pet hates. Ac-
cepting the premises of the jury system would mean viewing jurors neither as child
1997]
The University of Chicago Law Review
In expecting so little from our jurors, perhaps we sometimes
get what we deserve. Even the most enthusiastic defender of the
peremptory challenge must acknowledge that it is not perfect,
and that hidden biases will slip past the most masterful trial
lawyer. I worry about the message we are sending to that inevi-
tably biased juror: "Go ahead, act on your bias. We are all biased,
and none of us can resist acting on those biases. So go ahead and
act on yours. After all, you passed the test of peremptory chal-
lenges."
I worry even more about the message we are sending to the
vast numbers of prospective jurors who are challenged perempto-
rily yet who hold no hidden biases, and who one day will return
as prospective jurors in other cases: "No, I can't say exactly what
it is about you that I don't like. But the slope of your brow or the
cut of your clothes or the manner of your walk all tell me you are
a lying bigot." What do these false allegations about the fair-
mindedness of prospective jurors do to their confidence in a sys-
tem whose whole function is to unearth the truth? If we are so
incompetent at distinguishing a fair juror from a bigot, what
hope is there that we can distinguish a witness's lies from a wit-
ness's truths, or guilt from innocence?
Judge Broderick has articulated this concern eloquently:
The peremptory [challenge] is a renegade in this nation's
trial procedures. . . . [P]eople will accept the decrees of
courts only so long as the institution is perceived to be both
unbiased and governed by the "quiet rationality" that is its
distinction. It uses reason to confront disputes that are some
of the most intractable, frightening, and emotion-laden that
society has to offer. In the courtroom, the dispassion of the
rule of law ideally answers hysteria and rumor. Every accu-
sation or idea is tested by discourse and evidence. The logic
of the court's decision-making is laid bare to the litigants,
other judges, scholars, the media, and the community. The
trial itself must unfold in public view.
savants nor as child simpletons but as responsible adults. It would mean abandoning
our cumbersome, patronizing rules of evidence and trusting jurors with the facts. It
would mean respecting the jurors' privacy, abandoning our probing of their psyches,
beliefs, and practices in extended voir dire examinations. It would mean permitting
prospective jurors to serve on juries unless, after asking only the questions needed to
uncover interests and biases that would equally disqualify professional judges,
grounds for their recusal appeared.
Alschuler, 56 U Chi L Rev at 232 (cited in note 1).
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In contrast stands the peremptory challenge. It functions as
a repository of the unexamined fears, suspicions, and ha-
treds held by attorneys and their clients. With the few ex-
ceptions now interposed by courts, the peremptory is exer-
cised secretly, for any or no reason at all, unchecked by in-
quiry or debate. 2
This is not simply a theoretical problem. Even if one as-
sumes that some prospective jurors have hidden biases that can
be detected and eradicated by peremptory challenges, the re-
moval system is grossly overinclusive. In my experience, most
people challenged peremptorily are truly challenged for no reason
at all. There is a tremendous psychological pressure for lawyers
on both sides to exercise some peremptory challenges. I have
never witnessed a trial in which each side did not exercise at
least half of the allowed peremptory challenges, and in my expe-
rience it is a relatively rare case in which both sides do not ex-
haust their full complement of peremptory challenges.2"3 Lawyers
have a significant procedural incentive to exercise all of their
peremptory challenges: if they do not, in most jurisdictions they
lose any appellate argument regarding erroneous rulings on
challenges for cause.0 4 In fact, if a lawyer is satisfied with the
jury but has not exercised all peremptories, it is a well recognized
tactic to continue to exercise all remaining peremptories by
challenging the prospective jurors seated in the designated alter-
nate seat, thus exhausting all peremptories without changing the
'Broderick, 65 Temple L Rev at 417-18 (cited in note 2) (citations omitted).
"3 Indeed, in the method that I use, and that I believe most of my Colorado colleagues
use, to select civil juries, there is no so-called "presumptive" jury, and each side must ex-
ercise all of its peremptory challenges.
'See, for example, United States v Torres, 960 F2d 226, 228 (1st Cir 1992); United
States v Hardy, 941 F2d 893, 897 (9th Cir 1991); People v Macrander, 828 P2d 234, 246
(Colo 1992); People v Daniels, 172 Ill 2d 154, 665 NE2d 1221 (1996); State v Mitchell, 674
S2d 250, 254 (La 1996); Degarmo v State, 922 SW2d 256, 262-63 (Tex App 1996). But see,
at one extreme, cases like Ross, discussed in the text accompanying notes 162-72, sug-
gesting that even if a defendant "preserves" the argument that he or she was forced to
use a peremptory challenge by the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause, any such er-
ror is harmless unless it can also be shown that the resulting jury was not impartial. Ac-
cord United States v Annigoni, 57 F3d 739, 744-45 (9th Cir 1995); State v Russell, 917 P2d
557, 560 (Utah Ct App 1996). At the other extreme, there are many cases that suggest,
even post-Ross, that such error remains a ground for per se reversal, at least when one is
talking about a direct interference with a defendant's right to exercise peremptory chal-
lenges (for example, by way of an erroneous Batson ruling) as opposed to an indirect in-
terference (by way of an erroneous ruling on a challenge for cause). See, for example,
United States v Ricks, 776 F2d 455, 460-61 (4th Cir 1985) (granting a new trial because
exercise of peremptory challenges were used on those not even considered for jury selec-
tion); United States v Broussard, 987 F2d 215, 221 (5th Cir 1993) (distinguishing between
erroneous rulings on challenges for cause because of peremptory challenges, and errone-
ous rulings on peremptory challenges themselves).
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identity of the jurors who will actually decide the case.05 Finally,
of course, peremptory challenges are quite often exercised not to
exclude a seated prospective juror, but rather to include an as-yet
unseated prospective juror.206
The net effect of all of this is that perfectly acceptable, per-
fectly fair and perfectly impartial prospective jurors are being ex-
cluded in droves, and they are leaving our courthouses with a
justifiable frustration and cynicism about our system.
I also worry about the mixed messages we send on the effect
of bias. Lawyers and judges pay lots of voir dire lip service to the
notion that although we are all biased in some ways, many of us
can set those biases aside. That is an important, noble and, I be-
lieve, accurate proposition. Indeed, it is one of the principles be-
hind the very notion that when twelve people decide a case the
sharpest edges of their individual biases will get rounded-off by
the deliberative process. Our system of peremptory challenges,
on the other hand, substantially devalues both the ability of ju-
rors to set those biases aside and the curative effect of delibera-
tion. Peremptory challenges tell these prospective jurors that
they all have biases much worse than they will own up to (or,
perhaps, are even conscious of), and that most of these biases are
debilitating and will prevent them from being fair even if they
think they can set them aside. This perception denies the reality
that biased jurors can indeed set aside their biases in order to
judge impartially. This is what deliberation is all about.0 7 In-
'This tactic works when peremptory challenges are exercised by the so-called
"strike" method: a panel of prospective jurors is called up at random from the entire ve-
nire, equal in number to the number of jurors plus alternates that will be needed, plus
the total number of peremptories; the panel is then examined; challenges for cause are
then exercised only to the panel; replacement panelists are seated and examined; and
then the peremptories are exercised, again only to the panel. The other basic method of
exercising peremptory challenges is called the "sequential" or 'jury box" method, in which
the entire venire is examined before any prospective jurors are called up, and peremptory
challenges are exercised as the prospective jurors are called up at random to be seated.
The significant difference between these two methods is that in the strike system the
lawyers know, as they are exercising their peremptories, which prospective juror will be
replacing the person who is peremptorily challenged. For two good descriptions of these
two methods see Gurney, Note, 21 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 227-28 (cited in note 2), and
Leonard B. Sand, Batson and Jury Selection Revisited, 22 Litigation 3, 3-4 (Summer
1996).
'Again, this tactic works in the strike method but not in the sequential method. See
note 205.
2An English barrister has expressed surprise at how little the American system
trusts jurors' abilities to be impartial despite their biases:
I think if I knew what the backgrounds of the jurors were ... I still wouldn't chal-
lenge them. I don't think I would be able to handle the American system, actually
... because I happen to take the view that whatever one's personal prejudices, the
chances are that a juror called to jury service and knowing the weight and responsi-
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deed, the very presence of an opposing bias, or of a juror who is a
member of a group that is the object of such bias, can aid in sup-
pressing the expression of that bias in the verdict. 8 In any
event, and not surprisingly, empirical studies show that lawyers
are no better at predicting the way biases might be expressed in
verdicts than they are in detecting bias itself.0 9
Finally, and most fimdamentally, peremptory challenges re-
flect an astoundingly simplistic view of the whole nature of hu-
man bias. They trivialize the way in which we are all biased in
some sense and over a wide spectrum. Professors Zeisel and
Diamond have described the complexity of juror bias this way:
All jurors' experiences have shaped their values and atti-
tudes, and these, in turn, are likely to shape jurors' percep-
tions of the trial evidence and hence their votes. In this
sense, "prejudice" is not only ineradicable but often indistin-
guishable from the very values and attitudes of the commu-
nity that we expect the jurors to bring to the trial.210
I am worried not so much that lawyers fool themselves into
believing they actually can ferret out hidden biases, as I am with
the demeaningly simplistic message this system sends to pro-
spective jurors by presupposing that all people more or less fall
into the two categories of biased and unbiased, or, even worse,
into the two categories of biased for the prosecution and biased
for the defense. In reality, of course, every juror brings with him
or her a complex constellation of experiences that has produced a
complex constellation of biases. It is only at the extreme where
those biases coalesce into a particularly deep and strongly held
viewpoint that they cannot either be set aside entirely at the jury
room door or at least surrendered to the rational persuasion of
fellow jurors.
By firing their simple peremptory challenge guns at the bi-
ased among us, lawyers are shooting us all, and the injuries are
taking their toll on the public's confidence in the jury system.
bility upon him will do his utmost to discard prejudice.
Quoted in Hans and Vidmar, Judging the Jury at 49 (cited in note 77).
" See the studies cited in Marder, 73 Tex L Rev at 1082 (cited in note 2) (arguing that
group deliberation promotes transparency in decisionmaking).
'See id at 1080-81 nn 156 & 157.
"Zeisel and Diamond, 30 Stan L Rev at 531 (cited in note 6).
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B. Peremptory Challenges Improperly Shift the Focus of Jury
Selection from the Individual to the Group
Our justice system is a temple to principles of individual re-
sponsibility. Every day, freedoms and money are sacrificed on the
altars of that temple, and they are sacrificed to the axiom that
we are all individuals with free will, and are all ultimately re-
sponsible for our individual actions. With only a very few excep-
tions,"' our laws at every stage of the process and in every con-
ceivable context warn us that we will be held accountable for our
individual actions, and comfort us that we will not be held ac-
countable for the actions of others. Moreover, our temples are
built on the foundation that rational inquiry into the facts of a
case, limited by rules of evidence, can determine exactly what ac-
tions an individual took and what actions he should be held ac-
countable for. How strange that the high priests in these tem-
ples-to whom the only constitutional command is to be impar-
tial-are selected not for their observable individual traits but
for supposedly hidden traits inferred from their membership in
various identifiable groups.
The logical unit of jury impartiality is the individual juror,
not real or imagined coalitions of jurors who share the same skin
color, gender, political views or social standing. Partiality, and
therefore impartiality, inheres in the character of each individual
juror:
Jury competence is an individual rather than a group or
class matter. That fact lies at the very heart of the jury sys-
tem. To disregard it is to open the door to class distinctions
and discriminations which are abhorrent to the democratic
ideals of trial by jury."1
To be sure, it can be a complex, time-consuming, and incomplete
process to inquire into the individual characteristics of prospec-
tive jurors. But neither the difficulty nor inherent imprecision of
that effort justifies its abandonment to the crass prejudices of
group stereotyping.
By giving lawyers the power to veto prospective jurors for no
reason at all, we of course give them license to act on the basest
of human prejudices. But the problem of de-individualizing the
jury selection process is much deeper than a handful of, or even a
nation full of, racist and sexist lawyers. By relying not only on
" The doctrines of complicity and, to a lesser extent, conspiracy come to mind.
2
-J.E.B., 511 US at 145-46 n 19, quoting Thiel v Southern Pacific Co, 328 US 217, 220
(1946).
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skin color or sex, but also on a universe of other surface charac-
teristics from which they believe they can detect hidden biases,
lawyers are making crass and, by definition, unjustifiable gener-
alizations about large classes of jurors. In this sense, the proposi-
tion that black jurors will not convict a black defendant is no
more offensive than the proposition that jurors who wear pocket
protectors are pro-prosecution.21 Neither our rules of evidence
nor even our most basic ideas of due process tolerate such pre-
posterous propositions, and it is amazing that we tolerate them
in jury selection.
Professor Melilli has quantified, in a manner of sorts, the ex-
tent to which these baseless generalizations figure into the exer-
cise of the peremptory challenge. He examined all reported cases
from the date Batson was announced in 1986 through 1993, and
concluded that an astonishing 52 percent of all those peremptory
challenges involved what he characterized as a "group stereo-
type."214 These stereotypes ranged from the not-so-exotic "prior
criminal activity" to such ridiculous examples of prejudice as
"from Texas," "inner city person," "from New York," and my per-
sonal favorite, "prior jury service."" Professor Melilli summa-
rized his findings with this rhetorical suggestion:
The reader can, of course, examine [these results] and form
his or her own conclusion about whether lawyers are truly
serving their clients' interests by removing these groups of
venirepersons, or whether the whole business of striking
people from participation on the jury on these grounds is at
the least silly, if not offensive.1 6
The problem of group moneychangers in the temples of indi-
viduality is not an abstract one. Every time a prospective juror is
peremptorily challenged we are telling that prospective juror
that the foundation of this system is not evidence, but rather
rumor, innuendo, and prejudice.217 I cannot count the number of
times I have seen prospective jurors flash me a look of betrayal
when, after they have passed through the gantlet of challenges
for cause, they have been excused peremptorily because of their
"A friend of mine who was a chief prosecutor for over ten years once confided this
peculiar piece of prosecutorial folk wisdom to me. He admitted a few years later that he
needed to revise this rule when one of his pocket-protector jurors was a holdout for ac-
quittal. The elusively malleable nature of these untestable folk wisdoms seems to be their
most reliable feature.
... Meli~li, 71 Notre Dame L Rev at 497 (cited in note 2).
2" Id at 497-98.
...Id at 499.
1 See text accompanying notes 196-206.
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educational level or their occupation or the kind of car they
drive. 18 Is it any wonder that these people leave our courtrooms
thinking that the whole trial process is just as trivial and flawed
as jury selection?
Some commentators have actually argued that the unstated
irrationality of the peremptory challenge is a strength, not a
weakness. These commentators suggest that by hiding the irra-
tionality of bigotry and other group prejudice in the cocoon of the
peremptory challenge, the system benefits by not having to
"trade" explicitly in these embarrassing issues,"' I suggest these
21 Some of the more cynical trial lawyers to whom I have mentioned this observation
have expressed surprise and doubt, believing that all prospective jurors have as their
prime goal to be excused from jury service by hook or crook. Of course, I sometimes see
these kinds of people, but substantially more often I see prospective jurors who either
want very much to serve, or, at the very least, accept their obligation to serve with the
kind of valiant resignation akin to most citizens' views about the obligation to pay taxes.
My experience is that most prospective jurors take their roles very seriously, at least by
the time we have reached the peremptory challenge phase, and I sense they are regularly
offended when they are excused for unexplained reasons, about which they naturally as-
sume the worst.
219 See, for example, Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful
Power", 27 Stan L Rev 545, 553-54 (1975):
The peremptory, made without giving any reason, avoids trafficking in the core of
truth in most common stereotypes.... W~e have evolved in the peremptory chal-
lenge a system that allows the covert expression of what we dare not say but know is
true more often than not.
I honestly cannot comprehend what "core of truth" Professor Babcock thinks is locked in-
side the stereotypes that drive most peremptory challenges. Stereotypes seldom become
stereotypes because they are true. Most are simply temporary cultural expressions of the
irrational fears all humans have of the unknown-of different races, of different places,
and of different viewpoints. If one had any doubt at all about the "core of truth" in these
stereotypes, one need only look back at the stereotypes of yesteryear. In a famous trial
handbook quoted by Justice Marshall in his Batson concurrence, Dallas prosecutors were
trained not to take "Jews, Negroes, Dagos, Mexicans or a member of any minority race on
a jury, no matter how rich or how well educated." 476 US at 104 n 3 (Marshall concur-
ring) (citation omitted). In yet another notorious example of lawyer folk wisdom, Clarence
Darrow once advised that women should be avoided in all defense cases, and that
"Presbyterians are too cold; Baptists are even less desirable.... [Kleep Jews, unitarians,
Congregationalists, and agnostics." Quoted in James Morton, Jury Selection, 137 New L J
561, 562 (1987). Finally, celebrity lawyer Melvin Belli had these misogynisms to share
about the role of women on juries:
If the plaintiff is a woman and has those qualities which other women envy-good
looks, a handsome husband, wealth, social position-then women jurors would be
unwise. Woman's inhumanity to woman is unequalled. They are the severest judges
of their own sex.
Women... are desired jurors when plaintiff is a man. A woman juror may see a man
impeached from the beginning of the case to the end, but there is at least the chance
the woman juror (particularly if the man happens to be handsome or appealing) that
[sic] the plaintiffs derelictions in and out of court will be overlooked. A woman is in-
clined to forgive sin in the opposite sex; but definitely not in her own.
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commentators would quickly be disabused of this notion by
spending some time watching lawyers in voir dire ask prospec-
tive jurors about their television-watching habits, their magazine
subscriptions, and their theories on toilet-training. The proposi-
tion that lawyers, in the exercise of their peremptory challenges,
are permitted to act, and indeed are often acting, on their most
base, bigoted, stereotyped, and irrational hunches screams out to
everyone present during voir dire. We are not fooling anyone, ex-
cept apparently a few law professors, by refusing to shine the
light of rational inquiry on these insupportable hunches.
Of course, Batson has greatly exacerbated this problem of
de-individualizing the jury selection process, by so paternalisti-
cally insisting that peremptory challenges be screened for any
hint of impermissible group bias. Batson teaches us that some ir-
rational stereotypes are constitutionally permissible, and some
are not. We implicitly give institutional approval to those innu-
merable hunches that do not happen to touch upon the untouch-
able areas of race, ethnicity, or sex. We encourage lawyers to tell
us they did not excuse Mr. Jones because he was black, but
rather because he was a Gemini.
In our relentless post-Batson hunt for lawyers with the te-
merity to act on those particular irrational hunches that are
deemed constitutionally impermissible, we of course must traffic
in an inquiry whose very coin is group composition. Chief Justice
Burger criticized this kind of de-individualizing in his Batson
dissent:
A further painful paradox of the Court's holding is that it is
likely to inteiject racial matters back into the jury selection
process .... Today we mark the return of racial differentia-
tion as the Court accepts a positive evil for a perceived one.
Prosecutors and defense attorneys alike will build records in
support of their claims that peremptory challenges have
been exercised in a racially discriminatory fashion by asking
Melvin M. Belli, Sr., 3 Modern Trials § 51.68 (West 2d ed 1982). Exactly what is the "core
of truth" in these stereotypes?
To be fair to Professor Babcock, she has candidly retreated from her "core of truth"
suggestion and from her unabashed enthusiasm for peremptory challenges:
What I failed to recognize, however, was that, even though no words were spoken,
tides of racial passion swept through the courtroom when the peremptory challenges
were exercised. Everyone could see what was happening .... Perhaps the silence
harbored thoughts worse than those that might have been said.
Barbara Allen Babcock, A Place in the Palladium: Women's Rights and Jury Service, 61 U
Cin L Rev 1139, 1147 (1993). However, Professor Babcock maintains her position that
peremptory challenges can be both effective and constitutional, provided they are coupled
with other jury selection reforms. Id at 1174-80.
1997]
The University of Chicago Law Review
jurors to state their racial background and national origin
for the record . 220
Lawyers and judges are now forced to engage in a kind of
amateur anthropology-categorizing the race and ethnicity of the
prospective jurors and arming themselves with their versions of
the official bean count in anticipation of the inevitable Batson
challenge. This amateur anthropology is not only institutionally
embarrassing, it is unspeakably intrusive to prospective jurors.
Judges should not have to decide whether Ms. Fujimoto-Gonzalez
is an Hispanic, an Asian, or an Aleutian Islander. I cannot
imagine a more distasteful, irrelevant, undemocratic, or damag-
ing line of inquiry.
If all that were not enough, judges are on notoriously thin ice
when we engage in this amateur anthropology. Even before Bat-
son, there have been spectacularly ridiculous gaffes committed by
judges when they put jurors into wrong ethnic or racial pidgeon-
holes.22' We can expect more of the same as long as Batson and
peremptory challenges are both with us.
Batson has injected a new affirmative action twist into the
racism and sexism of peremptory challenges. But neither malig-
nant nor benign race, ethnic, or sex discrimination has any place
in jury selection, and neither lawyers nor judges can, or should,
focus their attention on the race, ethnicity, or sex of prospective
jurors. By doing so, the real question-whether a particular indi-
vidual juror can be impartial in a particular case-is getting lost
in the anthropological shuffle.
The elimination of the peremptory challenge would invigo-
rate our jury selection system with a long overdue dose of indi-
viduality. I heartily agree with Professor Marder's vision of a
jury selection system in which the focus is on the individual ju-
ror's ability to be impartial, and not on membership in any
group:
'Batson, 476 US at 129-30 (Burger dissenting) (citation omitted). In fact, however,
and contrary to Chief Justice Burger's predictions in this regard, it has been my experi-
ence that lawyers never ask these racial or ethnic questions directly of the prospective ju-
rors. Instead, they leave us judges to flounder in these dangerous anthropological waters
completely untethered to any actual information on these issues, except what we can
glean from the prospective jurors' names and appearances.
' In his dissent in Batson, Chief Justice Burger discussed the case of People v Motton,
39 Cal 3d 596, 217 Cal Rptr 416 (1985), in which Mr. Motton's conviction was reversed on
appeal because there were no blacks on the jury. In fact, however, there was a black
woman on the jury, who contacted the press with some degree of surprise when she read
of the reversal and of the erroneous reports of her own race. 476 US at 130 (Burger dis-
senting).
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My understanding of "impartial" would require the Court to
put into practice what it has long expressed in case law: pro-
spective jurors are to be judged on an individual basis and
no prospective juror should be excluded because of an immu-
table characteristic.... I would... start with the premise,
as courts do in England, that all prospective jurors who meet
the statutory criteria are competent to serve. Some may still
be excluded from the petit jury for cause either because they
are related to the parties, because they are connected to the
litigation, or because they enter with a closed mind and be-
lieve they cannot be impartial. We should start, however,
with the view that is deeply embedded in our democratic so-
ciety that people will be judged as individuals and will not
be presumed to be unfit to serve as jurors because of some
stereotypical notion about their group identity.2
C. The Peremptory Challenge Injects an Inappropriate Level of
Adversariness into the Jury Selection Process
By this I do not mean that peremptory challenges give the
lawyers a chance to be nasty to each other during voir dire,
though they certainly do that.223 I mean that the goal of jury se-
lection is to end up with twelve fair jurors, and the use of per-
emptory challenges tends instead to result in juries with six pro-
prosecution jurors and six pro-defense jurors.224 Two sets of par-
tial jurors do not an impartial jury make.
This balkanization of the jury happens because of the way
peremptory challenges mesh, or do not mesh, with the other
parts of jury selection. The idealized model of the peremptory
challenge views bias as a rather simple condition distributed
normally, that is, in bell-curve fashion, over the general popula-
tion. In this model, the most extreme pro-prosecution jurors are
excused peremptorily by the defense, and the most extreme pro-
defense jurors are excused peremptorily by the prosecution,
leaving jurors somewhere in the middle of the bell curve. This is
the so-called "leveling effect" touted by many supporters of the
'Marder, 73 Tex L Rev at 1133-34 (cited in note 2) (citation omitted).
'When one lawyer makes a Batson challenge, he or she is in effect calling the other
lawyer a bigot, and when a prima facie case is made out, a neutral reason proffered, and
the neutral reason resisted, the name calling accelerates from bigot to liar. We therefore
litigate these issues in an atmosphere almost always devoid of any remnants of civility
and professionalism.
'But of course it is a gross oversimplification to label jurors this way. See text ac-
companying note 210. Also, this model assumes an equal distribution of pro-prosecution
and pro-defense jurors in any given venire. But see text accompanying notes 193-95.
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peremptory challenge." 5 But this model ignores the relationship
between peremptory challenges and challenges for cause, ignores
the complexity of the bias inquiry, ignores a kind of feedback ef-
fect in which the very process of voir dire may actually cause im-
partial jurors to become partial, and ignores the detrimental im-
pressions which this process leaves on prospective jurors who are
excused.
The most "extreme" prospective jurors are of course elimi-
nated during challenges for cause, after a justifyingly adversary
process. The prospective jurors who are passed for cause have
survived those adversary fires, and therefore already lie, at least
by any objective measure, in the center of the bias bell curve. At
the very least, then, the supposed leveling effect of a handful of
peremptory challenges is grossly exaggerated because the venire
has already been leveled by an unlimited number of challenges
for cause.226
In fact, as a result of having to make very discrete and in-
deed binary decisions about the very non-discrete and complex
problem of human bias, lawyers' oversimplified voir dire runs a
great risk of driving otherwise neutral prospective jurors into
pro-defense or pro-prosecution camps. This is a particularly
virulent strain of the "go-ahead-and-act-on-your-bias" disease
discussed above.22 Otherwise impartial jurors who are constantly
bombarded in voir dire with questions accusing them of being se-
cret agents for the prosecution or secret agents for the defense
may very well feel compelled to join one of those mind-sets.
Even if peremptory challenges do not in fact result in the
balkanization of juries, they create the unmistakable impression
that balkanization is the goal. Prospective jurors who go through
the process-and especially those who are in great numbers ex-
cused even though they have no bias22 -are given the distinct
impression that the prosecution will "pick" six pro-prosecution
jurors and the defense will "pick" six pro-defense jurors. 9 This
perception of a balkanizing process inflicts just as much institu-
'For example, the Swain Court itself described one of the functions of the peremp-
tory challenge to be "to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides." 380 US at 219.
"'But see text accompanying notes 230-35, arguing that the peremptory challenge
has an extreme effect on the composition of the jury itself, as distinguished from its mod-
est effect when looking at the entire venire.
'See text accompanying notes 201-02.
See text accompanying notes 202-06.
'I have seen a few brave lawyers in my courtroom-usually prosecutors-actually
ask prospective jurors during counsel's voir dire what they, the jurors, think the lawyers
are trying to accomplish in voir dire. We get a lot of "trying to pick fair jurors," but a sur-
prisingly large number of "trying to find jurors favorable to one side or the other."
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tional damage in lost public confidence as actual balkanization
does. Indeed, perceived balkanization can be much more damag-
ing, because many more prospective jurors are excused than
serve, and those excused prospective jurors leave the process be-
fore they can see who actually ends up on the jury. And, of
course, they never deliberate and therefore never get to experi-
ence firsthand the fact that most jurors are not biased, or the fact
that even those who are biased can put their biases aside and ac-
cede to the rational persuasion of their co-jurors during delibera-
tions. Instead, the excused, non-biased venireperson leaves
thinking that he or she was excused precisely because he or she
was not biased, and therefore that the entire purpose and goal of
this adversary selection process was to find two equal groups of
oppositely-biased jurors.
Finally, even ignoring real and perceived balkanization,
there are good arguments that the "leveling effect" is itself incon-
sistent with basic notions of juror impartiality. First, it is not at
all clear what it is we are trying to "level." The conventional the-
ory is that peremptory challenges level the venire's tendency to
be partial,"0 but critics would argue and have argued that what
is actually being leveled is the very diversity guaranteed by the
fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment."' The
problem has its roots in simple arithmetic, and in the fact that
statistically significant notions like "fair cross-section" lose their
meaning when we move from a large population like the venire to
a very small population like the jury itself. In this sense, the
Court in Holland v Illinois 2 was perfectly correct in refusing to
extend the fair cross-section requirement from the venire to the
jury. It cannot be seriously contended that a defendant has a
right to insist that the twelve jurors who actually hear the case
reflect a fair cross-section of the community. When we are deal-
ing with large numbers of summoned jurors, the samples are so
large that they should be fairly representative of the community;
if they are not, some discriminatory force may be at play. But ju-
ries are made up of only twelve people, and to require such a
small sample to be "representative" has little statistical meaning.
Instead, we recognize that in any given case, the unguided hand
of fate may select from a perfectly representative venire an ab-
solutely unrepresentative jury, and we accept that risk as the
"See note 225 and accompanying text.
"' Marder, 73 Tex L Rev at 1063-66 (cited in note 2).
2493 US 474,480-84 (1990). See note 125 and accompanying text.
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price we pay for not infecting the selection process with impracti-
cal and meaningless representational constraints. 3
But it is one thing to accept the known risk that in any given
case fate may mis-sample a representative venire, and quite an-
other to permit the peremptory challenge to do so in virtually
every case. Again, the problem is that we are dealing with a very
small number of jurors. As we can see from the history of the
peremptory challenge in this country,"4 just a handful of peremp-
tory challenges can result in the total exclusion of significant
groups that were part of the fair cross-section. This "leveling ef-
fect" of the peremptory challenge is so massive that the fair
cross-section requirement can lose all of its meaning. 5
The English recognized that as their venires became more
and more heterogeneous, peremptory challenges made less and
less sense, because of their awesome power to distort that het-
erogeneity. Indeed, apart from the rhetoric surrounding the Cy-
prus spy trial, 6 the institutional reason most commonly ad-
vanced for the 1989 elimination of the English peremptory chal-
lenge was the increasing diversity of the English venire, and the
threat to that diversity posed by the peremptory challenge."
Another problem with the leveling effect is that it springs
from an exaggerated view of the utility of the adversarial process
in selecting juries. Our system already recognizes that jury selec-
tion, in contrast to the truth-finding process once the jury is se-
lected, is simply not best accomplished in the pure fires of the
adversary paradigm. Judges exert a substantial amount of
unabashedly non-adversary control over jury selection. We wel-
come the prospective jurors to our courtrooms, we give them in-
troductory instructions covering some basic legal principles, we
tell them we want to try to find twelve impartial jurors, we con-
'To suggest that the jury itself must consist of a designated percentage of individu-
als belonging to cognizable groups brings to mind the ancient and long-abandoned Eng-
lish doctrine of"de medietate linguae." Under that doctrine, foreign merchants on trial in
England in certain cases had a right to have one-half of their juries be made up of their
own countrymen. 28 Edw 3, ch 13 (1354) (Eng); Blackstone, 4 Commentaries at *352
(cited in note 9). Needless to say, that bizarre doctrine did not survive our adoption of the
Sixth Amendment. United States v Woods, 299 US 123, 130 (1936); People v Vesely, 587
P2d 802, 806 (Colo Ct App 1978); Commonwealth v Acen, 396 Mass 472, 487 NE2d 189,
191-92 & n 7 (1986).
See text accompanying notes 96-111.
'See Marder, 73 Tex L Rev at 1063-66, 1131-34 (cited in note 2).
'See text accompanying notes 66-67.
See, for example, John F. McEldowney, "Stand By for the Crown:" An Historical
Analysis, 1979 Crim L Rev 272, 281-82. See also Samuel J. Cohen, The Regulation of Per-
emptory Challenges in the United States and England, 6 BU Intl L J 287, 313-14 (1988)
(Parliament's primary rationale for eliminating the peremptory challenge was to preserve
the "random nature ofjury selection.").
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duct some preliminary voir dire, and indeed in most federal
courts we conduct all of the voir dire."' From the minute jury
selection starts-interrupted only by that awkward moment
when we tell them about the mysteries of the peremptory chal-
lenge 9-- the unwavering message we send to prospective jurors
is that this jury selection process is an objective effort to find
twelve impartial jurors, with very little input from the advocates.
The proposition that twelve impartial jurors can best be se-
lected by two sides intuitively vetoing those suspected of being
the most partial, after all of them have already been determined
to be impartial, is no more sensible than the proposition that
each side should be able to select six jurors from the impartial
venire. We no longer admit to this sort of trial by compurgation
because we recognize that the ideal juror should no longer be a
witness-with knowledge of the case, with loyalties to one side or
another, and with extrinsic views about the litigants' credibil-
ity-but rather should be an impartial judge of the credibility of
witnesses.
The very ideal of impartiality contains within it the principle
that it is best achieved by some neutral power's application of
objective criteria, and that is precisely the initial message we
send when we go through the whole process of challenges for
cause. After the advocates question the prospective jurors and
are given an opportunity to argue, a neutral power, the judge, de-
termines whether prospective jurors do or do not meet certain
'For a survey of voir dire practices in the various states and federal districts, see V.
Hale Starr and Mark McCormick, Jury Selection: An Attorney's Guide to Jury Law and
Methods (Little, Brown 2d ed 1993). There has been some movement in Colorado, and I
suspect similar movements elsewhere, to adopt in the state courts the general federal
method of having judges conduct most or all voir dire, at least in criminal cases. In the
spring of 1995, the Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure recommended to the Colo-
rado Supreme Court that our Rule 24 be modified to adopt the federal practice of judge
voir dire supplemented with written questions from counsel. The recommendation was
based on a survey of all 111 district judges in Colorado. There was a 70 percent response
rate, and of those that responded, 73 percent supported the modification, 22 percent op-
posed it, and 5 percent had no opinion. Letter (with attachments) dated June 29, 1994
from District Judge Steven T. Pelican to Chief Justice Luis D. Rovira (on file with U Chi
L Rev). After public hearings, the Colorado Supreme Court decided not to adopt the rec-
ommendation. Letter dated June 7, 1995 from Chief Justice Anthony F. Vollack to Dis-
trict Judges Steven T. Pelican and John N. McMullen (on file with U Chi L Rev). Al-
though I share many of my colleagues' criticisms of the efficiency of counsel's voir dire, I
do not agree that the solution is to have judges perform that function. The reason coun-
sel's voir dire is so inefficient is that they must ask questions broad enough to
"intelligently" exercise their peremptory challenges. There is no doubt in my mind that if
peremptory challenges were eliminated, and voir dire questions were refocused on the is-
sue of whether a juror could be fair and impartial, instead of on his or her ice cream eat-
ing habits, the waste we all see in counsel's voir dire would be curtailed greatly.
'See text accompanying notes 195-96.
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disqualifying conditions. But the peremptory challenge system is
a kind of adversary process gone amok, unbounded by the checks
of any neutral authority. Imagine any other adversary process
where each advocate not only gets the customary opportunity to
inquire, but then gets an alternating opportunity to decide all the
issues, without even being required to articulate his decision. It
might sound something like this:
Judge: Are counsel ready for peremptory decisionmaking?
Prosecutor: Yes, judge.
Defense lawyer: Yes, judge.
Judge: All right. There are four issues to be decided:
(1) Whether Defendant shot Joe Victim; (2) Whether Defendant
acted knowingly; (3) Whether Defendant acted in self-defense;
and (4) Whether Defendant acted in the heat of passion. The
People's first peremptory decision, please.
Prosecutor: Thank you, judge. The People respectfully decide
as to issue 1 that Defendant did in fact shoot Joe Victim.
Judge: Thank you. Defendant's first peremptory decision,
please?
Defense lawyer: Judge, the Defendant respectfully decides as
to issue 3 that Defendant acted in self-defense.
Judge: All right. I don't need to elicit further peremptory de-
cisions. A judgment of acquittal enters." °
We do not permit this sort of silly substantive game-playing
because the whole system is designed to resolve these issues ra-
tionally, after logical presentation of and inquiry into all the
facts. We do not complain that these are difficult issues incapable
of being determined after rational inquiry, or that counsel's in-
tuition should be the metric by which they are all to be meas-
ured. Instead, we try the case, and in doing so we retain some
level of institutional confidence that our lawyers will be compe-
tent enough, and our impartial jurors smart enough, to separate
the wheat from the chaff. We should do no less when we set
about to select those impartial jurors.
'The defense won because it had two dispositive issues-whether Defendant killed
the victim and whether Defendant acted in self-defense-and the prosecution could only
knock out one of those two issues with its first peremptory. Obviously, such an irrational
system would put a premium on the gamesmanship of the lawyers and their tactical abil-
ity to define the issues and maneuver them in an advantageous way. This is really just an
extreme example of the current sideshow we call peremptory challenges.
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CONCLUSION
Peremptory challenges were born of irrational royal origins
two hundred years before juror impartiality had any meaning.
They enjoyed a spotty English history, suffered a shameful his-
tory in the United States, and were ultimately abandoned in
England. Maybe none of this should be enough for us to abandon
a tradition so old and so widespread. But even assuming the per-
emptory challenge ever worked in this country as anything other
than a tool for racial purity, and even assuming it is working to-
day in its post-Batson configuration to eliminate hidden juror bi-
ases without being either unconstitutionally discriminating or
unconstitutionally irrational, I submit that its institutional costs
outweigh any of its most highly-touted benefits. Those costs-in
juror distrust, cynicism, and prejudice-simply obliterate any
benefits achieved by permitting trial lawyers to test their home-
grown theories of human behavior on the most precious com-
modity we have-impartial citizens.
At worst, these homegrown theories are our old friends ra-
cism, sexism, and class hatred all dressed up in twentieth cen-
tury psychobabble, still stubbornly resistant to the most well in-
tentioned fine-tuning of Batson. At best, they are animus-free
nonsense, but nonsense nonetheless. In either case, the daily in-
fliction of these theories on our citizen-jurors is exacting a palpa-
ble cost in lowered public confidence in the quiet rationality of
our jury system. If we cavalierly let those institutional costs ac-
cumulate, and permit our quiet rationality to be drowned out by
the cacophony of an irrational jury selection process, I am afraid
that at some point the damage to the entire system may be ir-
reparable. An American Cyprus spy trial may come along,24' but
the right to a jury trial itself may be thrown out along with the
peremptory challenge bath water.
"
4 See text accompanying notes 66-67. Maybe the O.J. Simpson criminal case was our
Cyprus spy trial, and maybe the peremptory challenge fallout from that case is yet to be
fully felt.
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